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Abstract
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC) were introduced in 1985 by Neal Koblitz and Victor 
Miller. Small key size made elliptic curve attractive for public key cryptosystem implemen­
tation. This thesis introduces solutions of efficient implementation of ECC in algorithmic 
level and in computation level.
In algorithmic level, a fast parallel elliptic curve scalar multiplication algorithm based 
on a dual-processor hardware system is developed. The method has an average computation 
time of j  Elliptic Curve Point Addition on an n-bit scalar. The improvement is n Elliptic 
Curve Point Doubling compared to conventional methods. When a proper coordinate sys­
tem and binary representation for the scalar k is used the average execution time will be as 
low as n Elliptic Curve Point Doubling, which makes this method about two times faster 
than conventional single processor multipliers using the same coordinate system.
In computation level, a high performance elliptic curve processor (ECP) architecture is 
presented. The processor uses parallelism in finite field calculation to achieve high speed 
execution of scalar multiplication algorithm. The architecture relies on compile-time detec­
tion rather than of run-time detection of parallelism which results in less hardware. Imple­
mented on FPGA, the proposed processor operates at 6 6 M H z  in GF(2167) and performs 
scalar multiplication in 100pSec, which is considerably faster than recent implementations.
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W ith the rapid and expansive growth of Internet, the need for communication security is 
increasing. Financial institutions, manufacturing plants and general public use Internet to 
exchange private information. Further expansion of information technology (IT) is tied to 
the confidence of Internet users to the security of data transaction on Internet. Secure infor­
mation exchange is vital for E-commerce, and public key cryptography is the most efficient 
way to achieve data exchange security between two unfamiliar parties on the Internet.
Public key cryptography was introduced in 1976 by Diffie and Heilman [28]. RSA, the 
first popular public key cryptosystem, which is based on the difficulty of integer factorization 
was introduced shortly after. RSA is widely accepted and is used for many cryptographic 
applications. In 1985, Koblitz [3] and Miller [4] independently introduced elliptic curve 
cryptography, which is basically based on the group of points on an elliptic curve (EC) over 
a finite field.
Providing the same security level, elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) uses smaller key 
size compared to RSA. ECC implementations require less power, less memory and less 
computation power compared to RSA implementations. These features makes ECC"Very
1
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1. INTRODUCTION
attractive for implementation on constrained devices such as wireless devices, handheld 
computers and smart cards.
Efficient implementation of elliptic curves cryptosystems can be classified into two basic 
levels. In the higher level efficiency is tied to the efficiency of the scalar multiplication 
algoritbms(Chapter 3 and 4). On lower level, efficiency goes down to finite field arithmetic, 
and mostly to finite field multiplication (Chapter 5). This thesis proposes an efficient scalar 
multiplication algorithm as well as a new architecture for efficient elliptic curve arithmetic 
implementation.
Although implementing security algorithms in software is easier, it is relatively slow, and 
has the effect of slowing down and consuming the valuable time of the main processor of 
the host system. Hardware solutions are attractive specially when there is a large volume of 
secure transactions. Considering the current growth trends it is expected that the demand 
for fast security processors will be high in the future.
1.2 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2, gives an elementary introduction to Finite Fields and Elliptic Curves. It covers 
some of the mathematical theory behind the construction of finite fields and elliptic curve 
group and the basic equations that govern the point addition and point doubling on an 
elliptic curve. Finally, it describes the idea of creating a security system based on elliptic 
curve and gives estimation of the strength of elliptic curve cryptosystem.
Chapter 3, provides a comprehensive survey on currently used elliptic curve scalar multi­
plication algorithms. Different coordinate systems are explained and EC point addition and 
doubling formula in each coordinate is expressed and compared to each other. Scalar mul­
tiplication algorithms are categorized . Algorithms based on scalar recording explained and 
evaluated. Special scalar multiplication techniques such as point halving method, Mont­
gomery algorithm and ,ECC based on Koblitz curve discussed at the end of the chapter.
Chapter 4, introduces a new fast algorithm for scalar multiplication. The new technique 
is explained and simulation results are compared to conventional double and add methods 
[10].
2
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Chapter 5, describes the proposed architecture for a high speed elliptic curve processor. 
A thorough survey on the elliptic curve processors hardware implementations is carried out, 
and the proposed processor is compared to them. The RTL simulation result is provided 
and is compared to few similar design. The results of the survey in chapter 2 is used here 
to implement an efficient scalar multiplication algorithm.
R ep ro d u ced  with p erm issio n  o f  th e  copyrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction  prohibited w ithout p erm issio n .
Chapter 2 




D efinition 1 . A group consists of a set G together with an operation * defined on G which 
satisfies the following axioms.
1. Closure: for all a, b 6  G we have a * b € G
2 . Associativity: for all o, b, c 6  G we have (a* b) * c = a* (b* c)
3. Identity: for all a € G there exists e 6  G  so that a*e — e*a  =  a. The unique element 
e is called the neutral element in G.
4. Inverse: for all a E G there exists i £ G so that a*  i = i * a = e. i is unique and is
called inverse of a
We use the notation {G, *) to represent group G with group operation *. (G, x) and 
(G, +) are called multiplicative and additive group respectively. In an additive group, the
4
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2. PRELIMINARIES ON ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY
neutral element is represented by the symbol 0 and the inverse of a is denoted as —a. In a 
multiplicative group, the neutral element is represented by the symbol 1  and the inverse of 
a is denoted as a -1 .
(G,*) is called an Abelian or commutative group if for any a and b € G we have 
a-kb — b*  a.
if set G is finite, the group (G , *) is called a finite group. The number of elements in G 
is called the order of the group and is denoted by | G |
R ings
D efin ition  2. A ring is a set R  and two operations +  and x (called addition and multi­
plication, respectively) defined over R  which satisfies the following axioms:
1 . (R , +) is a commutative group.
2. Associativity of x : For all a, b, c 6  R  we have (a x b) x c =  a x ( 6  x c)
3. Distributivity of x over +: For all a, b, c G R, a x (b + c) = a x b + a x c  and 
(a + b ) x c  — a x c  + b x c
A ring in which the multiplication x is commutative is called a commutative ring. 
Fields
D efin ition  3. A field is a ring in which multiplication is commutative and every element 
except 0  has a multiplicative inverse.
So, we can define the field F  with respect to the operations x and +  if:
1. {R,  +) is a commutative group.
2. (R — {0}, x) is a commutative group
3. x is distributive over +
5
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If set F  has finite number of elements then F  is a finite field or a Galois Field . For example 
the set Zp =  {0 ,1 ,... ,p — 2,p — 1} where p  is a prime, with modular addition and modular 
multiplication is a finite field.
D efin ition  4. One way function is a function that provides for a computationally inex­
pensive mapping from set X to set Y for all x £ X  but becomes computationally infeasible 
when mapping an element from set Y to set X for most y 6  Y.
Discrete logarithm (DL) problem: A particular one-way function with x ,y  € G  such that 
the discrete logarithm of x to base y, denoted by log y (x), has a unique integer solution z 
where x  =  yz.
2.2 Elliptic Curves
Elliptic curves have been studied by mathematicians for more than a century. They have 
been playing an important role in number theory and cryptography. Elliptic Curves have 
been used in integer factorization and have played an important role in solving the famous 
problem known as Fermat’s last theorem. Elliptic curve cryptography was proposed inde­
pendently by Victor Miller [4] and Neil Koblitz [3] in the 1985. Elliptic curve cryptosystems 
are standardized and are commercially available.
2.2.1 Definition of Elliptic Curves
D efin ition  5. Elliptic curve E  over field K. is a set of points (x, y) with x ,y  6  K. which 
satisfy the equation:
E  : y2 +  a\xy  +  a$y = x 3  +  a 2 X2 +  0 4 X +  a& (2.1)
where 0 1 , 0 2 , 0 4 , 0 6  6  K, , together with a single element denoted O are called point of 
infinity [1 0 ].
The elliptic curve over 1C is denoted by E{K.). The number of points on £ (th e  cardinal­
ity) is denoted #E()C) or just # E .
6
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An elliptic curve can be defined over various fields. For example, field of complex 
numbers C, field of real numbers R, field of rational numbers Q, finite field over prime Fp 
or an extension field Fpn. If fC is a field, and 0 1 , 0 2 , 0 4 , 0 6  6  1C, we say E  is defined over 
1C. In this case the elliptic curve will be the set of points (x , y) where x, y 6 1C and (x, y) 
satisfy equation 2.1. In cryptography, elliptic curves over finite field Fp or Fp« are used. 
Specifically F 2 « is used more often since it leads to a more efficient design.
For fields of various characteristics, the equation 2.1 can be changed into simpler forms 
by a linear change of variables. For fields of characteristics two equation 2.1 is simplified to
E  : y2 + xy  = x 3 + a2x 2 +  0 6  (2.2)
where 0 2 , a 6 G F 2 n.
We consider the equations for field of characteristic 2 which is used in this work. Equa­
tion for a field other than characteristic 2 was omitted since they are not central to the 
discussions.
The Graph of Elliptic Curves
Figure 2.1 shows graphs of two typical elliptic curves defined over the field of real numbers. 
The graph of elliptic curve over a finite field is a finite of set of points as is depicted in 
figure 2.2. Each point in graph 2.2 is called a point on the elliptic curve and is denoted by 
a single letter such as P. The number of points on a elliptic curve over a finite field is an 
important cryptographic aspect of the curve and will be discussed later.
2.2.2 Point Addition Formula
Suppose P I  and P2 are two points on elliptic curve E{K). Choose P I and P2 and construct 
a line through these 2 points. In the general case, this line will always have a point of 
intersection with the curve. Now take this third point and construct a vertical line through 
it. The other point of intersection of this vertical line with the curve is defined as the sum 
of P I  and P2 , i.e. P3 =  P I  +  P2. If P I  and P2 are equal, then the line constructed
7
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Curve defined over the Field of Real Numbers
(b)
Figure 2.2: Graph of Elliptic Curve defined over GF(223)
0 I 2  3 4  3 6  7 8 9 10 I t  12 13 14 IS 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
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Figure 2.3: Elliptic Curve Point Addition Operation P3 =  P I  +  P2.
P2.
PI
in the first step is the tangent to the curve, which again, has exactly one other point of 
intersection with the curve. This operation is illustrated graphically in figure 2.3.
For each of the two elliptic curves equation 2.2 and 2.1 Analytical formulas representing 
P3  can easily be derived from the explained geometric procedures.
Addition formula for equation 2.1: The inverse of P I  = (x\ ,y i )  G E  is — P  =  (xi, — yi). 
If P2  ^  - P I  , then P3 =  P I  +  P2 =  (x3, y3) where
If P I  ±  P2
i2 + a : i
x 3 = A2 — A +  xi  — X2 
2/3 =  (Xi -  x 3 )A  -  2/1
(2.3)
9
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if P I  =  P 2 (2.4)
( 2 /3 =  {Xi +  2 3)A +  x 3 +  2/1 
Addition formula for equation 2.2: The inverse of P I  =  (2 1 , 2/1 ) G E  is — P  = (2 1 , 2 1  +  
?/i). If P2 7  ̂ —P I  , then P3 =  P I  +  P2 =  (2 3 , 2/3) where
In summary we define the following rules for elliptic curve point addition:
• If P  =  O we define —P  =  O
•  Equation 2.1: If P  =  (2 , y) =+■ —P  =  (2 , —y)
Equation 2.2: If P  =  (2 , y) =► —P  =  (2 , 2  +  2/)
•  If P I  7  ̂P2 =>• P3 =  P I  +  P 2  equation 2 . 1  and 2 . 2
• If P I  =  —P2 =► P I  +  P2 =  O
E llip tic  C urve G roup  Law
The Elliptic Curve addition operation satisfies the following properties:
1. Closer: (P  +  Q) € E
2. Commutativity: P  + Q = Q + P
3. Existence of identity: P + O = O + P
4. Existence of inverse: VP £ E3Q £ E  so that P  + Q = Q + P  = 0
\  _  »1+ 1/2 
X 1+X 2
if P I  ^  P2 z 3  =  A2  +  A +  2 1  +  2 2  +  0 2  
2/3 =  (si +  Z3 )A +  2 3  +  2/1
(2.5)
if P I  =  P2 (2 .6)
10
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5. Associativity: (P  +  Q) +  R  — (P  +  Q) +  R
All properties except 2 are easy to prove. For a proof on property 2 see [20].
Therefore Points on E  form an finite additive Abelian group with O as the identity 
element. If the elliptic curve is defined over a finite field, the elliptic curve additive group 
forms a finite Abelian group.
2 .2 .3  E llip tic  C urve D isc re te  L ogarithm  P ro b lem
For some group (G , x ) , suppose a, (3 G G. Given a  and /? find for an integer x  such 
that a 1  =  (3 is called the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). The DLP in Zp is considered 
difficult if p  has at least 150 digits and p  — 1 has at least one large prime factor (as close 
to p as possible). These criteria for p are safeguards against the known attacks on DLP. 
Although the discrete logarithm problem exists in any group, when used for cryptographic 
purposes the group is usually Zp. In fact discrete logarithm problem can be used to build 
cryptosystems with any finite Abelian group. Multiplicative groups in a finite field were 
originally proposed.
Definition 6 . elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) is defined as follows: we 
define, kP  =  P  + P  + P  H h P
S i  ■ i. i.— v  ^
k times
• ECDLP: Suppose P,Q E E(Wq) and Q = k P  for some k . Given P  and Q find k
No efficient algorithm is known to date to solve the ECDLP. Numerous cryptosystems 
based their security on the difficulty of solving the DLP. For example El-Gamal Cryptosys­
tem in Zp and Diffie-Hellman key exchange [20].
There are also a number of cryptosystems whose security is based on the difficulty of 
factoring large integers. One well-known example is the public-key system called the RSA 
cryptosystem, which is by far the most popular public key algorithm.
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2.3 Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem
Cryptosystems using elliptic curves are based on ECDLP. The basic operation in ECC is 




• Diffie-Hellman key exchange
•  Messy- Omura Encryption
• El-Gamal Public Key Encryption
• El-Gamal Digital Signature
•  Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA).
Detail explanation of these encryption systems can be found in [20] and [21]
Exam ple o f an Elliptic Curve C ryptosystem s: Diffie-Hellman K ey Exchange
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol was proposed in 1976 [28]. This protocol allows 
two or more participants to agree on a secret key without ever requiring access to a private 
channel. Even if Eve (The Eavesdropper) is able to see every message passed between the
principles, it is mathematically infeasible for her to deduce the secret key. The protocol is
as follows:
Suppose Alice and Bob want to agree on a shared secret key . First of all, there are 
public parameters P  6  E.  Then they start the following communication.
1 . Alice secretly chooses a random number n and sends Bob
2. Bob secretly chooses a random number m and sends Alice k s P  ■
3. The secret key is k_\keP =  kskAP-  Both Alice and Bob can easily compute, but Eve 
can’t, because of the difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem.
12
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Figure 2.4: Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
Alice Bob
kA =Alic Private Key kA =Bob Private Key
P = A Point on an EC (public knowledge)
4. Now Alice and Bob have the same key, ^ (fc ^ P ) and can use this key to send encrypted 
messages to each other
The most time consuming calculation in this system is k P  (Scalar Multiplication). Diffie- 
Hellman key exchange works for DLP as well as ECDLP.
Security o f an Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem
In this section we try to provide an overview of the security strength elliptic curve cryp­
tosystems. A typical system is based on Galois fields between 150-160, which are small 
enough for efficiency and are large enough for security.
There are two basic type of algorithms to solve discrete logarithm problem. General 
attacks which do not depend on the underlying group and specific attacks which depend on 
the representation [32].
Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is defined as follows: Let E{¥q) be an elliptic 
curve over F9  and let P  be a point in E(Wq) . For any point R  6  E(Fq) find the integer 
k, 0 < k < # P  -  1, ( # P  is the order of P ) such that kP  = R.
The most powerful general algorithm known at present is baby-step giant-step technique 
[20]. Algorithms in this group have running time no better that 0(y/p),  where p is the
13
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largest prime dividing n. Shank’s baby-step giant-step method [20] requires 0(^/p)  in both 
time and space. The storage requirement can be reduced significantly by using the Pollard 
method [20]. Pollard method requires y/p iterations on elliptic curve where each iteration 
requires 3 elliptic curve additions. Each addition take 10 field multiplications where each 
field multiplication takes 4 clock cycles to complete (using the proposed processor described 
in the last chapter). Then we need 40y^> clock cycles or QAy/qpSec to solve ECDLP. If 
the order of the curve E  contains a prime factor of at least 36 decimal digits, then we need 
«  0.4 x 1 0 18/nSec which is about 12000 years to complete the operation. See [32] for more 
explanation.
All methods for solving the discrete logarithm problem, except index-calculus method, 
can be adapted to solve EC discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP). This means that there 
exists no method for solving m  with a sub-exponential running time, m  should be prime, 
in order to be safeguarded against Weil decent attacks [63].
Certicom (www.certicom.com), a Canadian company, has announced challenges to break 
a typical ECC. Table 2.1 shows the challenge and the estimated time to break the ECC.
2.4 Elliptic Curve Cryptography Standardization
The development of standards is a very important point for the use of a cryptosystem. 
Standards help ensure security and interpret-ability of different implementations of one 
cryptosystem. There axe several major organizations that develop standards. The most 
important for security in information technology are:
•  International Standards Organization (ISO)
• American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
• Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
• Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)
• National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
14
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ECC2-79 79 352 HAC, Maple SOLVED Dec. 1997
ECC2-89 89 11278 HAC, Maple SOLVED Feb. 1998
ECC2K-95 97 8637 $ 5,000 SOLVED May 1998
ECC2-97 97 180448 $ 5,000
ECC2K-108 109 1.3 x 106 $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 SOLVED Apr. 2000
ECC2-109 109 2 . 1  x 1 0 7 $ 1 0 , 0 0 0
ECC2K-130 131 2.7 x 109 $ 2 0 , 0 0 0
ECC2-131 131 6 . 6  x 1 0 1 0 $ 2 0 , 0 0 0
ECC2-163 163 2.9 x 101 5 $ 30,000
ECC2K-163 163 4.6 x 101 4 $ 30,000
ECC2-191 191 1.4 x 102° $ 40,000
ECC2-238 239 3.0 x 102 7 $ 50,000
ECC2K-238 239 1.3 x 102 6 $ 50,000
ECC2-353 359 1.4 x 104 5 $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0
ECC2K-358 359 2 . 8  x 1 0 4 4 $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0
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Table 2.2: Elliptic Curve Standards and Algorithms
Standard Schemes
ANSI X9.62 ECDSA
ANSI X9.63 ECIES, ECDH, ECMQV
FIPS 186-2 ECDSA
IEEE P I363 ECDSA, ECDH, ECMQV
IEEE P1363A ECIES
ISO 14888-3 ECDSA
ISO 15946 ECDSA, ECDH, ECMQV
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) 
Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) 
Elliptic Curve Menezes-Qu-Vanstone Protocol (ECMQV) 
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
The most prominent ECC algorithm, the ECDSA was accepted in 1998 as ISO standard 
(IS014888-3), 1999 as ANSI standard (ANSI X9.62), and 2000 as IEEE (P1363) and Fips 
(186-2) standard. Several other standardization efforts are in progress. Table 2.2 shows the 
Elliptic Curve standards
2.5 Intellectual Property Issues
Contrary to RSA, the basic idea of Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems has not been patented, 
and in the beginning this seemed to be an important advantage. However, a number of 
patents have been applied for, on techniques that mostly aim at improving efficiency. In 
principle, it should still be possible to construct a secure, albeit not extremely efficient 
elliptic curve cryptosystems without licensing patents. The patents are mostly held by 
Certicom, a Canadian company which is marketing elliptic curve cryptosystem.
A number of these techniques are being considered for inclusion in standards and this
16
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will potentially make it hard to implement interpretable elliptic curve systems without 
licensing patents. On the other hand, some standardization organizations require the holders 
of patents on standardized techniques to guarantee ’reasonable’ licensing conditions. In 
summary, elliptic curves have lost many of their advantages as far as patents are concerned.
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Chapter 3 
Introduction to E C C  Computations
3.1 Introduction
In order to implement and elliptic curve cryptosystem one has to decide on the following 
options:
1. Defining Equation for Elliptic curve
• Weierstrass form [6]
• Koblitz Curves [2]




3. Scalar Multiplication technique k P  ie. k P  — P  + P  + P  + -- - + P
N V 1 1 y
k tim es
• Comb method [16]
18
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• Window method [10]
• Montgomery method [61]









In this chapter items 1, 2 and 3 are explained. Algorithms for finite field operation are 
explained in the last chapter. Item 4 is not discusses here.
Speed of a ECC system is determined by the above factors as well as implementation 
platform (Fig. 3.1). Using a dedicated hardware to speedup the underlying finite field 
arithmetic will increase the speed of elliptic curve operations as it is explained in the last 
chapter.
3.2 Elliptic Curve Definition
Definition 7. Let AT be a field of characteristics ^ 2,3, lets x 3 + ax + b (where a,b € K)  
be a cubic polynomial with no multiple roots. An elliptic curve over K  is the set of points 
(x, y) with x , y  € K  which satisfy the equation
y2 = x3 + ax + b (3.1)
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Figure 3.1: Platform option for ECC implementation 
Finite Field Arithmetic Implementation
Hardware Software
Classic Reconfigurable General purpose uP Embedded uP
ASIC FPGA Intel, RISC DSP, Smart Card
together with a single element denoted O and is called point at infinity. If K  is of charac­
teristics 2, then an elliptic curve over K  is the set of points satisfying the equation
y2 + y  =  x 3 + ax +  b (3.2)
[ ! ] ■
3 .2 .1  D ifferent Form s o f  E llip tic  C u rve E q uation  
W eierstrass Form [6]
An affine Weierstrass equation over field I f  is an equation of the form
E(K)  : Y 2 =  a \ X Y  +  a$y =  X x 3 -f- a2 X 3 +  a \ X  +  0 6  (3-3)
with ai,a2,Q4,06 G K.
K oblitz Form [2]
Two extremely convenient families of curves are the anamolaus binary curves (or ABC’s 
or Koblitz curves). These are the curves Eq and £) defined over Fjm by Ea : x 2 + xy  = 
x 3 +  ax2 +  1 . We denote by E a(F2m) the group of F 2 m-rational points on E a This is the 
group on which the public-key protocols are performed. As we will see, this group of curves 
speeds up the scalar multiplication [7].
20
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3.3 Elliptic Curve Point Representation
An elliptic curve can be represented using several coordinate systems. For each such system, 
the speed of point additions {ECADD)and doubling (E C D B L ) are different. Therefore 
a good choice of coordinate system is an important factor for elliptic curve exponentia­
tions. We give here the addition and doubling formulas for affine, projective, Jacobian, 
Chudnovsky and Lopez-Dahab coordinates. These coordinates are defined in section 3.4.1.
3 .3 .1  T h e A d d itio n  F orm ulas in  A ffine C oord in ate
Let
E a : y2 +  xy  = £3 +  ax2 +b  a,b €  F 2 ">
be an elliptic curve E  over F 2 "*. The addition formula for affine coordinates are the follow­
ings. Let Pi — (xi ,yi )  and P2 =  (£2 , 3/2 ) be two points on E a . Then the coordinates of 
P3 — P1 + p 2 = (X3 , 3/3 ) can be computed as shown in table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Addition Formula in Affine Coordinate
P 1 ^ P 2 P 1 = P 2
\ y\-yt
£ 3  =  A2  +  A +  x i +  X2  +  a X3  =  same
2/3 =  ( £ 1  +£3)A +  £3 +  2/1 X3  — same
Cost: I  +  2M  S Cost: I  +  2M  +  S
For simplicity, we neglect addition and subtraction in F 2 "» because they are much faster 
than multiplication and inversion in F 2 m . Let us denote the computation time of an addition 
(resp. a doubling) by t (P  +  P)  or t (ECADD)  (resp. t(2P) or t {E C D B L )) and represent 
multiplication (resp. inverse, resp. squaring) in F 2 *n by M  (resp. I , resp. S). Then we see 
that t (P + Q) = I  + 2M  +  S  and t{2A) = I  +  2M + 25 [8] .
21
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3 .3 .2  P ro jec tiv e  S p ace and  th e  P o in t a t In fin ity
D efinition 8. n-Dimensional projective space over field K  is the set of equivalence 
classes of n-tuple (xo,xi,X 2 , ■ ■ ■ , x n) with xo ,x i ,X 2 , . . . , x „ g K .  T w o  n -tu p le  (x0, x i , x 2, . ■., 
and (yo, yi, 2/2 , ■ • • > Vn) are said to be equivalent iff there exists non-zero element X e K  such 
that
(zo, x i ,  x 2, • • •, x n) (Aj/i, \ y 2 -t Ay3) • • • j ^Vn)
We write
( x Q, x i , X 2 , . . . , x n ) ~  (2/0 , 2/1,2/2, - - • ,  2/n)
Example: Projective line P It is the set of points (x, y)  excluding (0,0) with the 
points (Ax, Ay) identified with (x,y). If we select P  =  (x, y) , then all the points (Ax, Ay) 
are on the line joining P  to the origin. This is visualized in figure 3.2. Points with the same 
shape are equivalent. For every equivalence class we can choose a point lying on the unit 
circle as a representative. The projective line P^  is then represented by the unit circle with 
diagonally opposite points identified together.
Figure 3.2: Projective Line
(xl.yl)
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The equivalence class of (x , y , z ) is denoted by (x : y : z). If (x : y : z) is a point with 
2 ^ 0 ,  then (x : y : z) = ( x / z  : y / z  : 1). These are the finite points in .However, If 2  =  0, 
then dividing by 2  should be thought of as giving 0 0  in either the x or y coordinate, and 
therefore the points (x : y : 0) are called points at infinity in PjJ. The point at infinity on 
an elliptic curve is identified with one of these points at infinity in P  
The two-dimensional affine plane over K  is defined by
A l  =  {(*.2/) \ o c ,y e k }
We have an inclusion
a I ^ P 2k
given by
(x,y)  ‘- * ( x : y .  1)
In this way affine plane is defined with the finite points in P^.
A polynomial is homogeneous of degree n  if it is a sum of terms of the form axly^zk 
with a € K  and i + j  + k — n. If f ( x ,  y) is a polynomial in x  and y, then we can make it 
homogeneous by inserting appropriate powers of z. For example, if / (x , y) =  y 2—x 3—A x —B  
then we obtain the homogeneous polynomial F(x,y)  =  y2z  — x3 — A x z 2 — B z 3. If F  is 
homogeneous of degree n  then
F(x, y, 2 ) =  z3f ( x / z ,  y /z)
and
f ( x , y )  =  F(x,y ,  1)
The elliptic curve E  is given by y2 — x 3 + Ax  +  B. The homogeneous from is y2z = 
x3 +  A x z2 + B z 3. The point (x, y) on the original curve, corresponds to points (x : y : 1) 
in the projective version. To see what points on E  lie at infinity, set 2  =  0 and obtain 
x =  0. Therefore x =  0, and y can be any nonzero number. Rescale by y to find that 
(0 : y : 0) =  (0 : 1 : 0) is the only point at infinity on E. Using projective coordinate speeds 
up computation on elliptic curve.
23
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3.4 Choosing a Coordinate System
Using different projections, points on an elliptic curve can be represented in many different 
ways, as it is shown in the following list.
•  Affine Plane: (x, y ) E a : y2 +  xy  = x 3 +  ax2 + b a,b e  F 2 ">
•  Projective Plane: (x = X / Z , y  = Y /Z )  Ep : Y 2Z  +  X Y Z  =  X 3 +  a X 2Z  +  
bZ3 a,b € F2 ™
• Jacobian: (x =  X / Z 2, y =  Y / Z 3) E j : Y 2 = X 3 + a X Z 4 +  bZ6 a, b e  ¥p
• Chudnovsky: (X, Y, Z, Z 2, Z 3) P3 =  Pj +  P2 = P2 = (X3, Y3, Z3, Z32, Z33).
•  Lopez-Dahab: (x -  X /Z ,  y = Y / Z 2) Ed : Y 2+ X Y Z  = X 3+ a X Z 2+bZ4 a , b e  
F2m
3.4 .1  D iffe ren t C o o rd in a te  S y s te m s
T h e  A d d itio n  Form ulas in  P ro je c tiv e  C oord inates
For projective coordinates, we set x =  X / Z  and y =  Y/Z ,  giving the equation:
Ep : Y 2Z  = X 3 +  a X Z 2 +  bZ3 a , b e F p
Ep : U2Z +  X Y Z  = X 3 + a X 2Z  + bZ3 a ,b e  F2m
The addition formulas in projective coordinates for Fp are the following. Let P i =  (ATi, Yj, Z\),  
P2 =  (X 2 , Y<i,Z2 ) and P3 = P\ + P2 = (X3 ,Y3 ,  Z3), table 3.2 summarized the addition 
formula [8].
T h e  A d d itio n  Form ulas in  Ja co b ia n  C oord inates
For Jacobian coordinates, we set x =  X / Z 2 and y = Y / Z 3, giving the equation:
E j  : Y 2 =  X 3 + a X Z 4 +  bZ6 a , b e F p
24
R ep ro d u ced  with p erm issio n  o f  th e  copyrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction  prohibited w ithout p erm ission .
3. INTRODUCTION TO ECC COMPUTATIONS
Table 3.2: Addition Formula in Projective Coordinates for ¥p
P 1 ^ P 2 P1 = P2
u = Y2Z i -  YlZ2 u  — dZi2 +  3 X \ 2
V =  X 2 Z 1 — X 1 Z 2 v = Y1Z 1
w =  u2Z \ Z 2 — v3 — 2 v2X i Z 2 w = X{Y\v
t =  u8w






Y3 = u(v2X\Z2 — w )  — v3Yi Z2 ^ 3  - u(4w — t) — 8Y 2v2
Z3 = v3Z\Z2 Z3 =  8v3
Cost: 12M + 2S Cost: 7M + 5S
The addition formulas in the Jacobian coordinates are presented in table 3.3. Table 3.4 rep­
resents the point addition and point doubling formulae adapted from IEEE P1363 standard 
for comparison[21]A10-5, A10-7.
The Addition Formulas in Chudnovsky Jacobian Coordinates
We see that Jacobian coordinates offer a faster doubling and a slower addition than pro­
jective coordinates. In order to make an addition faster, we should represent internally a 
Jacobian point as the quintuple (X , Y , Z, Z 2, Z 3). This is called the Chudnovsky Jacobian 
coordinate and denoted by Jc. The addition formulas in the Chudnovsky Jacobian coor­
dinates are the following. Let P I  =  (Xi, Y\, Z\ ,Z\2,  Z\3), P2 =  (X 2 , Y 2, Z 2 , Z 2 2 , Z2 3) and 
P3 = Pi + P2 = P 2  = (X 3 ,Y3 , Z 3 ,Z 3 2,Z 3 3). Table 3.5 shows the addition procedure in 
mathbbFp.
The Addition Formulas in Lopez-Dahab Coordinates
We set x — X / Z  and y = Y / Z 2, giving the equation:
E d : Y 2 + X Y Z  = X 3 +  a X Z 2 +  bZ4 a , b e F 2m
25
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Table 3.3: Addition Formula in Jacobian coordinates for Fp
P 1 ^ P 2 P I  = P 2
Ui = X xZ22 S  = 4 X t Y 2
U2 = X 2Z i 2 M  = 3 X 12 + aZ14
Si =  X x Z23 T  = - 2 S  + M 2
II CO
H1 = U2 -  Ul
r  = S2 - S -  1
X 3 = - H 3 -  2U\H2 +  R 2 j
II£
Y3 = - S i H 3 + R(U i H 2 - X 3) Y3 = -8Yi4 + M ( S  -  T )
Z3 = Z \Z2H
CMII
Cost: 12 M  + 4S Cost: 4M + 6S
like other projective coordinates this coordinate we don’t need inversion for E C  A D D  and 
E C D B L  (Table 3.6) [9].
The key observation is that, point addition in projective coordinates can be done using 
field multiplication only, with no inversion required. Thus the inversion are deferred, and 
only one need to be performed at the end of a point calculation, if it is required that the final 
result be given in affine coordinates. The cost of eliminating inversion is an increased number 
of multiplication. So the appropriateness of using coordinated is strongly determined by 
the ratio I / M .  for an I / M  > 10 projective coordinates is recommended[9] [10].
Mixed Coordinate
It is evidently possible to mix different coordinates, i.e. to add two points where one is 
given in some coordinate system, and the other point is in some other coordinate system. 
We can also choose the coordinate system of the result. Proper use of mixed coordinates 
can lead to a faster point calculation. For a table of mix coordinate system refer to [8].
26
R ep ro d u ced  with p erm issio n  o f  th e  copyrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction  prohibited w ithout p erm ission .
3. INTRODUCTION TO ECC COMPUTATIONS
Table 3.4: Addition Formula in IEEE Standard for F2m
P l ^ P 2 P I  =  P2
U0 = X 0 Z l (b = c4)
So = Y0Z f Z2 =  X i  Z \
Ux = X i  Z l X 2 = (Xi  + cZ2)4
Si = Y iZ l U = Z2 + X 2 + Yi Z i
W  = U0 + Ui y 2 = X \ Z 2 +  U X 2
R  — So +  Si
t  = r  + z 2
L = ZqW
•■4IIbo
X2 =  aZ\  + T R  + W 3
V  — R X i  + LYi
Y2 = T X 2 +  V L 2
Cost: 15M +  7A +  55 Cost: 5M  +  4A + 55
Cost (Zi  =  1): 11M  +  7A  +  45
3.4.2 Coordinates Summary
Table 3.7 1 summarizes the cost of elliptic curve point calculation in different coordinates. 
Selection of the coordinate system depends on the implementation platform. As a rule of 
thumb, projective coordinates are preferred, unless there exists an efficient division imple­
mentation.
‘In some cases number of additions is calculated to be used in the performance calculation of the developed 
processor(chapter 5)
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Table 3.5: Addition Formula in Chudnovsky Jacobian Coordinates for Fp
P 1 ^ P 2 P1 = P2
Ui =  Xi  Z22 S  = 4 X i Y 2
U2 = X 2Z i 2 M  = 3 X \2 +  aZ i4
Si  =  YxZ23 T  = - 2 S  + M 2
S2 =  V2Zi3
H I  = U2 — Ul
r  = s 2 - s - i
X 3 =  - H 3 -  2UiH2 +  R 2
FhII£
Y3 = - S i H 3 +  R{UiH2 -  X 3) Y3 = - 8 Y i 4 + M ( S - T )
Z 3 = Z \Z2H Z3 =  2TiZi
Cost: 11M  + 4 S Cost: 5M  +  65
3.5 Scalar M ultiplication
Scalar multiplication (or point multiplication) is the heart of Elliptic Curve Cryptogra­
phy (ECC), which computes k P  for a given point P  and a scalar k. In public-key crypto­
graphic systems, elements of some group are raised to large powers. In case of RSA it is ak 
and in case of Elliptic curve it is k P  .
The scalar multiplication in ECC is the most dominant computation part of ECC. There 
are many algorithms for computing the scalar multiplication. The IEEE standard one is the 
binary non-adjacent form (NAF) which is not the most efficient one. Table 3.8 summarizes 
scalar multiplication techniques.
Scalar multiplication in elliptic curves is a special case of the general problem of modular 
exponentiation in Abelian group. Therefore it benefits from all the techniques available for 
the general problem and the related short addition chain problem for integers. However 
there are also efficiency improvements available elliptic curve case that have no analogue in 
modular exponentiation. There are three kinds of these [10]:
28
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Table 3.6: Addition Formula in Lopez-Dahab Projective Coordinates for F 2 m
P l ^ P 2 P I  = P 2
a  = y22 i 2 +  n A = bZi4
B  = X 2 Z 1 +  X \
C = Z \ B
D = B 2(C + aZ\2)
E  = A C
F  =  X 3 +  X 2 Z 3
G = X 3 + Y2 Z3
X 3 = A 2 + D + E X 3 = X l 4 + A
Y3 = E F  +  Z 3 G Y3 = A Z 3 + X 3 (aZ3 +  Y !2 +  A 4)
Z 3 =  C2 Z 3 =  X \ Z 2
Cost: 14 M Cost: 5M
1. Choose the curve, and the base field over which it is defined, so as to optimize the 
efficiency of elliptic scalar multiplication.
2. Use the fact that subtraction of points on an elliptic curve is just as efficient as 
addition.If we allow subtractions of points as well, we can replace the binary expansion 
of the coefficient n by a more efficient signed binary expansion.
3. Use complex multiplication. Every elliptic curve over a finite field comes equipped 
with a set of operations which can be viewed as multiplication by complex algebraic 
integers (as opposed to ordinary integers).
In general the following methods try  to optimize kP.  Generally the optimization is 
based on[ll]:
1. Recording of multiplier k
2. Precomputation
29
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Table 3.7: Cost of Point Addition and Doubling in Different Coordinate System
Coordinate Transform P  + Q 2 P Field
Affine ( X ,Y ) I +  2M + S I +  2M + S Fp
Standard projective {X/Z,  Y /Z ) 12 M  +  2 5 7M + 5S Fp
Jacobian projective (IEEE) { X / Z 2, Y / Z 3) 12M + 4S 4 M  + 5S Fp
Jacobian projective (IEEE) 
Using mixed coordinate
{ X / Z 2, Y / Z 3) 15 M  +  55 +  7A  
11M + 4S + 7A
5M + 5S + 4 A F2m
Chudnovsky projective { X , Y , Z , Z 2, Z 3) U M  + 4S 5M  + 6S Fp
Lopez-Dahab projective {X/Z,  Y / Z 2) 14 M  + 55 5M  + 9S F2m
3.5.1 Speeding up Scalar M ultiplication (kP)
Binary M ethod
This method which is also known as the double-and-add (square and multiply for RSA) 
method, is over 2000 years old [12]. The basic idea is to compute gk or k P  using the binary 
expansion of k. Let
n -l
k = J 2  bi? (3.4)
i=0
Then the following algorithm will compute k P  using binary method, it takes n x E C D B L  
and ^ x E C  AD D  on average [10].
m-ary M ethod
The binary method has an obvious generalization: Let
d—l 
k =  ^  Cirri1 
i=o
The algorithm in table 3.10 computes k P  using this representation
30
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Table 3.8: Classification of scalar multiplication techniques
Name of Method Basic Idea Application Example
Comb [16] Precompute tables of 2m Q Q fix DH key exchange
addition chains [7] sum^~gki k fix DSA
Windowing (Fix, Variable) 
m —ary [10]
Precompute tables memory k = Y ^ —o ciTn% Q is not known Security Server
Scalar recoding [7] fewer zero in binary representation of k (NAF)
CO
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Table 3.9: k P  using Double and Add Method
A lgorithm : Scalar Multiplication: Binary Method [10] 
Input: A p o in t P ,  an in te g e r  k =  b{ — 0,1
Output Q = kP
Q *— O
For i  = n-1 to  0 by -1 
Q «- 2Q
i f  bi =  1 then  Q <— Q + P  
EndFor 
Return Q
This method is paxticulary attractive if m  =  2r . For r  =  3 it will be similar to octal 
representation of k, and for r  =  4 it will be similar to hexadecimal representation of A;. 
If m  = 2r this algorithm takes (n — r) x E C D B L  (since d =  n/r, (d — 1 )r = n — r) and 
d x E C  A D D  and (m — 1) x E C  A D D  for precomputation [7] [10].
Modified m -ary  Method
In case of m  — 2r , It is possible to save some E C  A D D  at precalculation phase, by dropping 
the trailing zeros at each nn . ie. we calculate rrijP when is odd.
Using this method number of E C  A D D  is n / r  + (m — 2)/2. The number of E C D B L  
remain the same. It is worth mentioning that we need to select the optimized r for a 
specific length of k. There is always a specific r  for a k which minimizes the number of 
elliptic computations [7].
Window Method
The m-ary or 2r-ary method may be thought of as taking A;-bit windows in the binary 
representation of r, calculating the powers in the windows one by one, squaring them r  
times to shift them over, and then multiplying by the power in the next window [7]v In
32
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Table 3.10: kP  using m-ary Method
A lgorithm : Scalar Multiplication: m-ary Method [10]
In p u t: A p o in t P ,  an in te g e r  k — YliZo kirn1, ki € { 0 ,1 ,.. . ,  m  — 1}
Output Q = k P  
P I  *— P
For i  =2 to  (m-1) by -1
P l i  <— Pi- 1  +  P  (pre calculate, Pi — iP)
Q <— O
For i  = d-1 to  0 by -1
Q <— mQ  (if m =  2r, this requires r doubling)
Q <— Q +  k{P (pre calculations is required to calculate all ctP)  
EndFor 
Return Q
other words it can be regarded as a specific case of window method, where bits of the 
multiplier k are processed in blocks of r bits. Window method processes windows up to 
length r  disregarding fixed digit boundaries, and skips runs of zeros between them. These 
runs are taken care of by point doubling, which need to be computed in any case. We 
assume r  > 1.
Using sliding windows has an effect equivalent to using fixed windows one bit larger, 
but without increasing the precomputation cost. The computation cost of sliding window 
method is estimated as n  x E C D B L  and n /( r  +  1) x E C  A D D  [10].
R e d u n d an t N u m b e r System : B inary  N A F
Subtraction has virtually the same cost as addition in the elliptic curve group. The group 
negative of (x, y) is (x, x + y) in characteristics two and (x, —y) in odd characteristics. This 
naturally leads us to scalar multiplication methods based on addition-subtraction chains, 
which may reduce the number of point operation. The signed-digit (SD) representation can
33
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Table 3.11: kP  using Modified m-ary Method
A lgo rithm : Scalar Multiplication: Modified m-ary [10] Method
In p u t: A p o in t P ,  an in te g e r  k = YliZo k im \  ki £ { 0 ,1 ,.. . ,  m -  1}
Output Q =  kP
Pi <- P, P2 «- 2P
For i  =1 to  (m-2)/2 by -1
P 2 1 + 1  <— p 2t - i  +  P 2 (pre calculate, odd multiplies of P )
Q + - 0
For i  = d-1 to  0 by -1 
I f  kj 7^ 0 then
Let sj and hj be such th a t  kj = 2si h j , hj odd
Q ^ ( 2 r~°J)Q 
Q <— Q + Ph.,
E lse Sj <— r 
Q ^ - 2 siQ  
EndFor 
R eturn Q
be applied to all methods discussed so far, but this technique cannot be used for modular 
exponentiation in RSA.
This begins with the non-adjacent form (NAF) of the coefficient k : a signed binary 
expansion with the property that no two consecutive coefficients are nonzero. For example, 
NAF(29)  = (1,0,0, —1,0,1) since 29 =  32 — 4 +  1.
Just as every positive integer has a unique binary expansion, it also has a unique N A F .  
Moreover, N A F (k )  has the fewest nonzero coefficients of any signed binary expansion of k 
[7]. There are several ways to construct the N A F  of k from its binary expansion.
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Table 3.12: kP  using Window Method
Algorithm: Scalar Multiplication: Sliding Window Method [10]
Inpu t: A p o in t P ,  an in te g e r  k = W , h  G {0,1}
Output Q = kP  
Px <-P ,P 2 ^ 2 P  
For i  =1 to  (2r - 1 - l )
P21+1 P2 1 -1  +  P2 (pre calculate, odd multiplies of P)
j  <— n — IQ <— O 
For i  = d-1 to  0 by -1 
I f  kj ^ 0  then
Let t be th e  le a s t  in te g e r  such th a t  j  — t + 1  < r and kt = 1
hj < (fcj, kj—i , . . . )  kt ) 2  
Q ^ ( 2 0 - W ) ) g  +  P/i.
j  «- t -  1 





n =  where c* e  { -1 ,0 ,1}  for all i (3.6)
i= 0
Let the weight of a representation be the number of nonzero c*, and let w(x) be the min­
imum weight of any such representation of x. A non-adjacent form N A F  is a representation 
with CiCi+\ =  0  for a li i  > 0 .
Theorem: Every integer x has exactly one NAF. The number of nonzero in the NAF is 
w(x) The advantage of using the NAF is that, in general it has fewer nonzero than the binary 
representation, reducing the number of multiplications. The expected number of nonzero 
in a length n N A F  is n/3. NAF(k)  can be efficiently computed using the following
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in table 3.13. Table 3.14 shows the algorithm for scalar multiplication using Binary N A F  
method.
Table 3.13: C onverting a number to N A F
A lgorithm : Computing the N A F  of a positive [10] integer 
Inpu t: A p o s it iv e  in te g e r  k
Output NAF(k)  
i *— 0
While k >= 1
I f  k i s  odd then : ki <— 2 — (k mod 4), A; <— k — ki
Else k <— 0 
k <— k / 2 , i = i +  1  
EndWhile
Return (&j_i, fcj_2 , . . . ,  k\, ko)
The m —ary method may of course also be generalized to allow negative digits. However, 
the savings quickly go down, since the average number of nonzero in an n-digit generalized 
N A F  is n(m  — 1 )/(m  +  1), which is not much better than the n(m — l)/(m ) in the base-m 
representation for large m. Using Binary N A F  the algorithm in table 3.14 will compute 
kP.
The cost of the algorithm is n  doubles and n /3  additions. For a total of 4n/3 elliptic 
operation. This is about one-eighth faster than the binary method, which uses the ordinary 
binary expansion in place of the N A F  and therefore requires an average of n /2  elliptic 
additions rather than n/3.
W id th -w  N A F  M eth o d  [10]
The so called width-ic N A F  method is the special case of signed modified m-ary method, 
or N A F  representation of modified m-ary method, where m =  2W. A width-w N A F  of an
36
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Table 3.14: k P  using N A F  representation for k
A lg o rith m : Scalar Multiplication: NAF Binary Method [10] 
In p u t: A p o in t P ,  an in te g e r  k =  X̂ -Tq1 Cj2\c* =  —1,0,1
Output Q = kP  
Q <— O
For i  = n-1 to  0 by -1 
Q «- 2 Q
i f  bi =  1 then  Q <— Q + P  
i f  bi =  —1 then  Q <— Q — P  
EndFor 
Return Q
integer k is an expression 
d - 1
k< e  { -2 ” , _ 1  +  1 , . . . , 0 ,1 ,3 , . . . 1 2u'- 1 }
i= 0
In other words each non-zero coefficient ki is odd, |/cj| < 2W~1, and at most one of any 
w consecutive coefficients is nonzero. Every positive integer has a unique width-u; N A F ,  
denoted N A F w(k). Note that N A F 2 (k) =  NAF(k) .  N A F w(k) can be efficiently computed 
using N A F  algorithm in table 3.13 modified as follows: in the first statement of the While 
loop replace ki «— 2 — (k mod  4) by ki +—2 — (k mod 2W), where k mod 2W denotes 
the integer u satisfying u =  k(mod2 w) and — 2 W ~ 1 < u <  2 W~1.
It is known that the length of N A F w(k) is at most one bit longer than the binary 
representation of k. Also, the average density of non-zero coefficients among all width-u; 
NA F s  of length n is approximately n/(w  +  1 ) [1 1 ]. It follows that the expected running 
time of scalar multiplication using Width-u; is approximately E C D B L  +  (2W~2 EC ADD)  
for precalculation and (u> +  1 ) E C  ADD + n .ECDBL)  for the scalar multiplication itself [9]. 
Note that the number of E C D B L  is not changed. When using projective coordinates, the 
running time in the case n  =  163 is minimized when u; =  4. For the cases n =  233 and
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n  =  283, the minimum is attained when w =  5; however, the running times are only slightly 
greater when w — 4.
3 .5 .2  Scalar M u ltip lica tion  S u m m ary
Table 3.15 summarizes number of point addition and point doubling in each of the discussed 
scalar multiplication methods. As it is clear form the table, recording methods decrease 
number of additions, but number of point doubling remains almost the same. Although 
window methods are faster but they need extra memory to save 2 P, 3 P, — 1 )P.
Table 3.15: Number of Point operation in different scalar multiplication Method
Method # P  + Q (Average) # 2  P
Binary (double-add) n / 2 n
m-ary, m  = 2 r n / r  +  (2 r -  1) n — r
modified m-ary, m  =  2 r n / r  +  (2 r _ 1  — 1) n — r
Binary NAF (double-add,sub) n/3 n
width-u; N A F  Method n / ( r  + 1) +  2 r ~ 2 «  n
r-adic N A F  (Koblitz curves only) n/3 0
3.6 Special M ethods for Scalar M ultiplication
3 .6 .1  A n om alou s B inary  C urves (K o b litz  C urves)
Two extremely convenient families of curves are the anomalous binary curves (or ABC’s). 
These are the curves E q and E\  defined over F 2  by
Ea : y2 +  xy  =  x 3 + ax2 +  1, a € {0,1}
Using Koblitz curves speeds up the scalar multiplication calculation as indicated in 
table 3.15. However, there are concerns about the security of ECC using Koblitz curves. A 
complete discussion on Koblitz curves can be found in [2].
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3 .6 .2  P o in t H a lv in g
In [13], Knudsen introduces a new method for scalar multiplication on a non-supersingular 
elliptic curve over GF(2m). The idea is to replace all point doubling with a faster operation, 
called point halving. Moreover, Knudsen shows that the halving algorithm is superior to 
previous algorithms when it is implemented using affine coordinates and normal basis. 
However, the halving algorithm has a storage limitation if a polynomial basis is used, where 
the required storage is in the order of magnitude 0 ( n 2) bits. The halving algorithm and 
the Montgomery method cannot take advantage of Koblitz curves properties.
3.7 M ontgom ery Scalar M ultiplication Algorithm
A different approach for computing kP  was introduced by Montgomery [17] in 1987. This 
approach is based on the binary method and the observation that the x-coordinates of the 
sum of two points whose difference is known can be computed in terms of x-coordinates of 
the involved points. This method uses the following variant of binary method.
Table 3.16: Montgomery Scalar Multiplication Algorithm
A lgorithm : Montgomery Scalar Multiplication, in Projective Coordinate 
In p u t: A p o in t P  = (x, y) £ E, an in te g e r  k > 0, k =  &«2’> e  (0> 1}
O utput: Q = kP
P\ «- P, P2 <- 2P  
For i  = n-2 to  0 
i f  bi = 1  then
Pi <— Pi +  P2, P2 <— 2 P 2
else
P2 <— Pi + P2 , Pi 2Pi
EndFor
Q - P i
Return Q _
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Table 3.17: Montgomery Scalar Multiplication Algorithm in Projective Coordinate
A lgo rithm : Montgomery Scalar Multiplication, in Projective Coordinate 
In p u t: A point P  =  (x , y) £ E,  an integer k = 6*2*, bi = 0,1
O utput: Q = kP
X I  <— x, Z l  <— 1 , X 2 <— a: 4  +  b, Z 2 *— x 2 
I f  (k — 0 or x  =  0) 
R  <— O 
Stop
For i = n — 2 to 0 
if ki = 1 then 
Madd(Al, Zl ,  X2, Z 2 ) , Mdouble(X2, Z2) 
else
Madd(A2, Z2, X I ,  Z l ) , Mdouble(Al, Z l )
EndFor
Q =Mxy(Xl, Z1 ,X2 ,Z2)
Return Q
This method maintains the invariant relationship P2 —P1 = P,  and performs an addition 
and a doubling in each iteration. In [61] this algorithm is converted to projective space and 
after simplification the following algorithm is derived.
3 .7 .1  C alcu lation  
D oubling algorithm
Input: the finite field GF(2m); the field elements a and c =  6 2 "* ” 1 (c2  =  b) defining a curve 
E  over GF(2m), the x-coordinate X / Z  for a point P.  Output: the x-coordinate X / Z  for 
the point 2 P.
x(2 P) = X 4 + b x Z 4 (3.7)
40
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Table 3.18: Steps in Point Doubling, MdoubleQ
1 T i = c
2
CN*II
3 Z  =  Z 2
4 Ti = Z x T i
5 Z  = Z  x X
6
11
7 X  — X 2
8 X  =  X  +  Ti
z(2P) = X 2 x Z 2 (3.8)
This algorithm requires one general field multiplication, one field multiplication by the 
constant c, four field squaring and one temporary variable ( Table 3.18).
Addition algorithm
Input: the finite field GF(2m); the field elements a and b defining a curve E over GF(2TO);
the x-coordinate of the point P; the ^-coordinates X l / Z l  and X 2 /Z 2  for the points P I
and P2 on E. Output: The x-coordinate X l / Z l  for the point P I  +  P2.
= Ô i * Ei  +  X 2 x Z \ ) 2  (3.9)
X 3  =  x x Z 3 + (Ai x Z 2 ) x  (X 2 x Zi)  (3.10)
This algorithm requires three general field multiplications, one field multiplication by x, 
one field squaring and two temporary variables(Table 3.19).
Affine coordinates algorithm  M xy()
Input: the finite field GF(2m); the affine coordinates of the point P  =  (x, y); the x- 
coordinates X l / Z l  and X 2/Z 2  for the points P I  and P2. Output: The affine coordinates
41
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Table 3.19: Steps in Points Addition, MaddQ
1 T\ — x
2 X x = X x x Z 2
3 Zi = Z\  x  X 2
4 T2 = X i  x Zi
5 Zi = Zi  + X i
6 Zl = z l
7 X i  — Z i x  Ti
(xk,yk)  = (X2,Z2)  for the point P I .
x k =  ^  (3.11)
yk = {x + x k)[(y + x 2) + ( ^  + x ) &  + x)] x -  + y (3.12)
Z  2 Z l  X
This algorithm requires one field inversion, ten general field multiplications, one field 
squaring and four temporary variables (Table 3.20).
3 .7 .2  P erform ance
The performance of Montgomery scalar multiplication algorithm is shown in Table 3.21. 
Note that in Montgomery algorithm one point addition and one point multiplication is
needed for each bit in the scalar, while, whereas using NAF, on an average n /3  number
of point addition are needed for scalar multiplication. Even if the number of operation 
is divided by 3 the number of operation in Montgomery algorithm is less th a t the other 
methods.
3 .7 .3  S id e  channel A ttack
Side channel attack (SCA) on cryptosystems uses leakage of a certain side-channel informa­
tion such as timing, electromagnetic radiation and power consumption to obtain information
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about the private key.In elliptic curve cryptosystems scalar multiplication algorithms are 
target for SCA. In scalar multiplication k P  is calculated were k is a secret key and P is 
usually not a secret and even can be chosen by the attacker. If the sequence of executed 
instructions in the algorithm is directly related to the bits of the private key a successful 
power-analysis attack can be carried out on the cryptosystem. As in can be seen in table 
3.9 it is possible to distinguish a point addition by measuring the power of the device which 
is executing the algorithm. This makes the insecure against SCA. The algorithm presented 
in 3.16 is secure against power attack since the operation performed in each step of the 
scalar multiplication algorithm is not dependent to the bits of k.
The execution time of the algorithm in table 3.9 depends on the number of bits in the 
binary representation of k. This makes the algorithm vulnerable to time analysis attack.
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Table 3.20: Steps in Converting the Coordinates MxyQ (Table 3.17 )
1 if Z\ = 0 then output (0,0) and stop
2 if Z2 — 0 then output (x, x + y) and stop
3 T\ =  x
4 II
5 T3  =  Z\ x Z2
6 Z\ — Z\  x 7i
7 Z 1 = Z 1 + X 1
8 Z 2 — Zi  x  T\
9 X i  = Z2 x  Xj
1 0 z 2 =  z 2 +  x 2
1 1 Z2 =  Z2 x Zi
1 2 $ II
13 t a = t 4 + t 2
14 T4 = T4 x T3
15 t 4 = t 4 + z 2
16 T3 = T3 x T\
17 T3 = inverse(T3)
18 T4 = T 3 x T4
19 X 2 = X i X  T3
2 0 Z 2 =  X 2 +  T\
2 1 Z 2 = Z2 x T4
2 2 ^ 2  =  ^ 2 +  T2
Table 3.21: Cost of scalar multiplication for projective version of Montgomery algorithm
Representation Point Addition Point Doubling
Montgomery, Projective version 4M+1S+2A 2M +  4S +  1 A
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Chapter 4
Fast Parallel Elliptic Curve Scalar 
Multiplication
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a fast parallel elliptic curve scalar multiplication algorithm based on a 
dual-processor hardware system. The method has an average computation time of ^ EC ADD 
on an n-bit scalar. The improvement is nECDBL compared to conventional methods. When 
a proper coordinate system and binary representation for the scalar k is used, the average 
execution time will be as low as nECDBL, which proves this method to be about two times 
faster than conventional single processor multipliers using the same coordinate system.
4.2 Previous Work
Scalar multiplication is the basic operation for Elliptic Curve public key cryptography. The 
operation is defined as
Q = kP = P  + P  + . . . + P  (4.1)
where P  and Q are points on elliptic curve E  defined over GF(2”) and A; is a scalar in
45
R ep ro d u ced  with p erm issio n  o f  th e  copyrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction  prohibited w ithou t p erm issio n .
4. FAST PARALLEL ELLIPTIC CURVE SCALAR MULTIPLICATION
the range of 1 < k < Ord(E).
4.2.1 Conventional Scalar M ultiplication M ethods [10]
Double-and-add is probably the simplest (and oldest) method of scalar multiplication. The 
basic idea is to compute kP  using the binary expansion of k. Let
n—1
* =  (4.2)
i=0
then algorithm 4.1 computes k P  using Double-and-add method. The bit examination 
can be done from the most significant bit (MSB first method) or the least significant bit 
(LSB first method).
Table 4.1: Scalar Multiplication using standard binary method (LSB first)
A lgorithm : Point Multiplication, Binary Method 
In p u t: A point P, an integer k = X̂ -Tq1 6 * € 0,1 
O utput: Q = kP
Q <— P
R  <—  O For i  = 0 to n-1 by 1 
If bi — 1 Then 
R  <— R  +  Q 
Q+-  2 Q
EndFor 
Return R
The execution time for the algorithm is proportional to n Elliptic Curve point dou­
bling operation (ECDBL), and on average j  Elliptic Curve point addition operation (ECADD). 
Therefore the total average execution time will be nECDBL +  ^ ECADD. If redundant repre­
sentation (ie., binary NAF) is used to represent the scalar k, the average number of one or
minus one in the representation of k will be reduced to In this case the average execution
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time will be proportional to nECDBL 4- ÊCADD [10] [7]. Table 4.2 summarizes the execution 
time of different conventional scalar multiplication methods.
Table 4.2: Execution time of k P  using different conventional methods
Method Average Execution Time
Binary [10] (n -  1) ECDBL +  ECADD
Binary NAF [10] (n -  1)ECDBL +  ^ECADD
Window [10] nECDBL +  ECADD
It can be seen from the algorithm that in least significant bit-first (LSB first) method 
ECDBL and ECADD operations are independent, and they can be performed in parallel.
4.2.2 Speeding up Scalar M ultiplication
Many methods have been proposed in the literature to speed up scalar multiplication. These 
methods are classified in table 3.8. Constraints in scalar multiplications are speed, memory 
usage and security against side channel attack (SCA). Methods with precomputations, like 
Window method and Comb method are faster but they need extra memory to store pre­
calculated values. Addition Chain methods and Comb methods are very effective when k 
and P  are known in advance, respectively. In comparison Window methods are efficient for 
most cases.
4.2.3 Parallel Architectures
Parallel architectures for scalar multiplication can be done in the scalar multiplication 
algorithm level or in the calculation of ECDBL or ECADD itself. In [19] Moller proposes a 
parallel algorithm for scalar multiplication which is fast and secure against side channel 
attack. This paper proposes a method which uses two processors and a circular buffer, 
which acts as a communication channel between the two processors to reduce the average 
time of the scalar multiplication to nECDBL. This way the total time for ECADD is saved,and
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the system can be as fast as a system using radic N A F  for Koblitz curves.
4.3 Improved Parallel Scalar M ultiplication
The proposed method for calculating k P  uses two processors, one for execution of ECDBL 
and one for ECADD. The two processors may operate asynchronously. The ECDBL processor 
calculates 21P  and stores them to a circular buffer. The ECADD processor reads from the 
circular and performs the addition. Figures 4.1 and 4.3 depicts the operation flowchart of 
the ECDBL processor and ECADD processor respectively.
Figure 4.1: Point doubling Flowchart, Runs on ECDBL processor
S t a r t
s t o p
b u f f e r _ f u l l  (
p u t _ b u f f e r ( Q )
The two processors share the circular buffer and a counter. The buffer can be a standard 
circular buffer and should provide empty and full flags. _
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Figure 4.2: Point Doubling Flowchart, Runs on ECADD processor
t a r t ,
b u f f e r _ e m p t y ()
= R + g e t _ b u f f e r ()
s t o p
The ECDBL processor fills up the buffer with 2lP, and ECDBL processor takes the points 
from the buffer. If the data in the buffer are not consumed by the ECADD processor the 
buffer becomes full and the ECDBL processor needs to wait until there is free room in the 
buffer. On the other hand if there is not enough ones in the binary representation of k, 
the buffer becomes empty after a while and ECADD processor needs to wait until data is put 
into the buffer by ECADD processor. In the hardware implementation the buffer should be 
implemented using dual port RAM/register so that both processors can have simultaneous 
access to it. In software implementation locking mechanism is needed for accessing the 
counter and the buffer, since they are accessed from the two processes.
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Table 4.3: Point Doubling Algorithm, Runs on ECADD processor 
A lgorithm : Point Doubling
In p u t: A point P,  an integer k =  ^"Jq 1 b%21, bi 6  0,1 
O utput: 2iP,  Stored in the buffer 
Global: i ,  b u ffe r
Q + - P
i := 0 
While i<n
If bi =  1 then 
If buffer_full()
Continue 
put _buff er(Q )
Endlf 
Q < - 2 Q  
i := i +1 
EndWhile
4.3.1 Performance of the Parallel Algorithm
The performance of the algorithm depends on the ratio of ECADD/ECDBL and the probability 
of occurrence of nonzero ( 1 — P(0) ) in the binary representation of the multiplier k. The 
ECADD/ECDBL ratio depends on the coordinate system in which the elliptic curve calculation 
is performed. And P(nonzero) depends on the binary representation form of k. For example 
in NAF representation P(nonzero) = 5 . Table 4.5 summarizes the cost of elliptic curve 
point calculation in different coordinate systems.
Simulation results of the algorithm are summarized in table 4.6. The results show 
that when NAF representation for k is used, the algorithm keeps the average number of 
ECADD operations at about n/3, regardless of n  and ECADD/ECDBL ratio. The number of 
extra ECDBLs that we need in addition to ^ ECADD depends on ADD/DBL ratio. Therfore for
50
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Table 4.4: Point Adding Algorithm, Runs on ECADD processor
A lgorithm : Point Addition 
In p u t: 2iP,  Read from the buffer 
O utput: R  =  kP  
Global: counter i ,  b u ffe r  
R < - 0
While i<n Or Not bu ffer.em pty ()
I f  Not buffer_em pty()
R*—R+  g e t_bu ffer()
EndWhile 
R eturn R
equal ECADD the faster the ECDBL, the faster the multiplication will be. It can be seen 
from the results that if ECADD/ECDBL > P ( l)  then essentially the number of ECDBL remains 
constant, which means ECDBL is being executed almost always in the background. Running 
the simulation for n =  160 leads to table 4.7 which predicts the execution of the algorithm 
using different coordinate system for elliptic curve and NAF for representation of k. It can 
bee seen from table 4.7 that the algorithm is 2 times faster than single processor scalar 
multiplication method.
4.3.2 Security Against Side Channel Attack (SCA)
The execution time of the algorithm depends on the scalar integer k. For example if k —
100... 1001 the execution time will be close to nECDBL. In case of k = 10101... 101010 the 
execution time will be ^ECADD. Therefore the algorithm cannot be immune to SCA. But, 
since the execution time depends on the total number of ones and on the distribution of 
ones, many values of k will have the same execution time. Therefore the algorithm offers 
better security against SCA when compared to the standard double-and-add methods.
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Table 4.5: Execution time of ECADD and ECDBL in different coordinate systems
Coordinate Transform ECADD/ECDBL Field
Affine {X ,Y ) I  + 2  M / I  +  2 M  = 1 Fp
Standard projective (.X / Z , Y / Z ) 12M/7M  =1.7 Fp
Jacobian projective ( X / Z 2 , Y / Z 3) 12M /4M  =3 Fp
Jacobian projective ( X / Z 2, Y / Z 3) 14M /5M  =2.8 ¥ 2m
Chudnovsky projective (X , Y , Z , Z 2 , Z 3) 11M/5M =2.2 Fp
Lopez-Dahab projective ( X / Z , Y / Z 2) 14M /4M  =3.5 F2m
4.4 Conclusion
A parallel method for scalar multiplication is introduced which uses two processors to 
perform the kP  operation. Using proper implementation this method is 200% faster than 
single processor methods. The method can be implemented both in hardware and software.
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Table 4.7: Simulation result for 160-bit scalar, for different coordinate system.
Coordinate #Proc. ECADD/ECDBL #ECADD #ECDBL #O p
Affine 2 1 53 106 1440M
Chudnovsky projective 2 2 . 2  ^  2 53 54 800M
Jacobian projective 2 3 53 8 672M
Lopez-Dahab projective 2 3.5 ss 4 53 2 860M
Jacobian projective 1 (Table 3.14) 53 160 1276M
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Chapter 5
Architecture fo r  a Fast Elliptic Curve 
Processor (ECP)
5.1 Introduction
A high performance elliptic curve processor is presented. The processor uses parallelism in 
instruction level to achieve high speed execution of scalar multiplication algorithm. The 
architecture relies on compile-time detection rather than run-time detection of parallelism 
which results in less hardware. Implemented on Xilinx Virtex 2000 FPGA, the proposed 
processor operates at 6 6 M H z  in GF(2167) and performs scalar multiplication in 100p5ec, 
which is considerably faster than recent implementations. The 0.18pm ate level simulation, 
shows that the processor can at 300M H z,  performing k P  in 22/j.Sec.
Efficient utilization of hardware resources is a key element in a fast processor design. 
Most fast elliptic curve processors (ECP) use a bit-parallel word-serial (BPWS) finite field 
multiplier, either in direct form [57] [53] or in Karatsuba form [46] [49] [53] . In all the 
processors multipliers occupy the bulk of hardware. The proposed architecture maximizes 
the utilization of the multiplier.
In the field of elliptic curve cryptography, when calculating the speed of a scalar multi­
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plication algorithm, finite field multiplication is considered to be the most time consuming 
operation. Finite field addition (and squaring in ONB designs) is considered to be free[10] 
[21] (pp 127-130). It goes to such an extent that in the analysis of scalar multiplication 
algorithms, the cost of addition is ignored . In some software implementation reports, the 
cost of addition and squaring is ignored [9] as well. This can be true in software implementa­
tions or in hardware designs using serial finite field multipliers (see section 5.2). Considering 
some high speed hardware designs, we conclude that, the execution time of addition and 
squaring becomes comparable to execution time of multiplication(table 5.1 ).
Table 5.1: Typical number of execution cycle of basic FF operations
Design Multiplication Addition Squaring
[46] 9 > 2 2  (est.)
[57] 7 3 3
[53] 12 < M  > 7 2 2
[62] 7 3 2
presented 8 3 2
Deducing from the above, overlapped execution hardware can be used to increase perfor­
mance. This approach, which is closer to complex instruction set computer (CISC) design, 
is successfully employed in [53] to pair multiplication with addition, and multiplication 
with squaring to increase the performance. However this approach increases the size and 
complexity of hardware. Using parallelism in instruction level , the compiler analyzes the 
program and detects operations to be executed in parallel. Such operations are packed 
into one large instruction. Therefore no hardware in needed for run-time detection of paral­
lelism. The reduced instruction set computer (RISC) type instruction set helps to prepare a 
more efficient instruction pack(fig. 5.10). The presented processor implements the following 
features to achieve high execution speed.
•  Parallelism in instruction level __
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• RISC type instruction set
• One cycle instruction execution
• Pipeline finite field multiplier
5.2 Previous Work
The hardware implementation of ECC has come a long way from a modest beginning of 
ASIC implementation on a 2  micron technology [32] running at 40M H z  to the 0.13 micron 
technology running at 500M H z  [52]. The FPGA implementation started off on Xilinx 
XC4000 with 2304 slices and 13000 gates [33] and presently is on Xilinx XC2V6000 having
6,000,000 gates running at 100M H z .  [46]
Advances in ASIC and FPGA technologies have led to new architectures and faster 
designs. Most changes are in the design of the finite field multiplier and in the architecture 
itself. New designs take advantage of this to introduce more parallelism in finite field 
calculation.
Elliptic curve cryptosystems can be implemented on GF(p) and GF(2m). Usually 
GF(2m) lead to a smaller and faster design. However, due to pending patents there are 
some restrictions on GF(2m) implementations. This thesis mainly discusses GF(2m) imple­
mentations. Based on the design constraints ECPs are implemented using ASIC or FPGA. 
Elliptic curve hardware implementations can be categorized as follows:
1 . Implementations utilizing a general purpose CPU and a finite field accelerator: The 
early hardware implementations fall into this category [32] and recently [41]. However, 
because of the evolution of system on chip (SoC) these implementations are becoming 
attractive [49].
2. Elliptic curve processors (ECP) based on serial finite field multiplier on GF(2m): 
These processors are compact but slower than other implementations [45] [34].
3. ECPs based on bit-parallel word-serial (BPWS) finite field multiplier on GF(2m) : 
This architecture results in a fast design and relatively larger hardware. With the
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dramatic increase of hardware accommodation , most recent fast designs fall in to 
this category [46] [57] [53].
4. P rocessors on CF(p): T hese processor use modular operations for finite field arith­
metic, therefore they utilize more hardware resources and are relatively slower than 
GF{2m) implementations [29].
5. Dual field, general purpose crypto-processors: These processors are also available 
commercially. They work in GF(p) as well as GF(2m). Since the design in not 
optimized for GF{2 m) they are usually slower than the third category [38] [52].
Table 5.2 1 summarizes most published designs. In table 5.3 speed of these implemen­
tations are listed. Comparing these designs is not easy, since they have been optimized 
for different purposes, having different architectures and are implemented on different plat­
forms. Since this work is optimized towards operating speed, in the following sections we 
compare our results to the faster designs. Wherever possible, we estimate the speed of the 
design we are comparing to, as if it would be implemented on a hardware similar to ours.
5.3 Elliptic Curve Calculation, Arithm etic Hierarchy
The hierarchy of arithmetics for EC point multiplication is depicted in figure 5.1. The 
scalar multiplication (k P ) algorithm is performed by repeated point addition and doubling 
operations. The point operations in turn are composed of basic operations in the underlying 
finite field (FF). The proposed processor performs finite field addition and squaring in one
1est.: estimated 
FF: Flip Flop LUT: Look Up Table 
M.O.: Massey Omura multiplier 
ONB: Optimal Normal Basis 
Poly.: Polynomial multiplier 
Pr.: Presented
Sc.: Scalable, Being able to change both field size and the elliptic curve parameters without reprogramming 
the hardware
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Table 5.2: List of EC hardware implementations
P la tfo rm Y ear H W  R es. Sc.
[32] ASIC 1993 ONB 1 1 0 0 0 Gates
[33] XC4062XL 1998 Poly. 1810 CLB Only GF((2~4)~9) could be placed and routed
[34] XCV300-4 2 0 0 0 ONB 1290 Slice Only 64bits of k are set to one
[57] XCV400E 2 0 0 0 Poly 3002, 1769 LUT, FF D=16, Montgomery kP
[36] ASIC 0.25 2 0 0 0 Poly 165000 Gates V Simulation result
[37] XC4085XLA 2 0 0 1 M.O. 1450 CLB Rapid Prototyping, Core Generator
[38] ASIC 0.25 2 0 0 1 Poly 880000 Gates y/ Dual Field, Power consideration
[39] XCV1000 2 0 0 2 M.O. 48300 LUT
[41] XCV2000E 2 0 0 2 Poly 2790 Slice (est.) Koblitz Curve
[42] ASIC 0.35 2 0 0 2 Poly 14298 Gates Compact
[43] XCV1000-6 2 0 0 2 ONB 2614 Slice
[44] XC2S200 2 0 0 2 Poly y/ Montgomery kP
[45] ASIC 0.35 2 0 0 2 ONB 2 0 0 0 0 Gates
[46] XC2V6000 2003 Poly 19440, 16970 LUT, FF Clock is Predicted,
[47] ASIC 0.35 2003 Poly 56000 Gates y/ Montgomery affine, EUA for inverse
[48] ASIC 0.35 2003 ONB ALU, Asynchronous
[52] Asic 0.13 2003 Poly 117500 Gates y/ Dual Field, 500MHz (max) for this particular field
XC2V2000E-7 2003 Poly 20068, 6321 LUT, FF V Montgomery kP, 0.302mSec for unnamed curves
[62] XC2V2000 2003 Poly 10017, 1930 LUT, FF
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Table 5.3: Speed of kp  of different ECPs, at the specified finite field, and maximum frequency
P la tfo rm G F (2m) C lk  (M hz) kP (m s) Scalab le
[32] ASIC ONB 155 40 27.000 est.
[33] XC4062XL Poly. 8 x2 1 16 4.500 est.
[34] XCV300-4 ONB 113 45 3.700
[57] XCV400E Poly 167 76.7 0 . 2 1 0
[36] ASIC 0.25 Poly 163 6 6 1 . 1 0 0 V
EPF10K250 163 3 80.000
[37] XC4085XLA M.O. 155 37 1.290
[38] ASIC 0.25 Poly 160bits 50 5.200 est. V
[39] XCV1000 M.O. 191 36 0.270
[41] XCV2000E Poly 176 40 6.900
[42] ASIC 0.35 Poly 160 1 0 20.602 est.
[43] XCV1000-6 ONB 113 31 0.810
[44] XC2S200 Poly 163 55 3.770 V
[45] ASIC 0.35 ONB 209 2 0 30.000 est.
[46] XC2V6000 Poly 233 1 0 0 0.123 est.
[47] ASIC 0.35 Poly 167 1 0 0 2.300 est. v/
[48] ASIC 0.35 ONB 173 Asynch. 1 . 2 0 0  est.
[52] Asic 0.13 Poly 160 bits 500 0.190 V
[54] XC2V2000E-7 Poly 163 66.4 0.143 V
[62] XC2V2000 Poly 163 6 6 0.233
Pr. XC2V2000 Poly 167 6 6 0 . 1 0 0
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Figure 5.1: Arithmetic Hierarchy in Elliptic Curve Calculation
Scalar M ultiplication Algorithm




clock cycle (excluding register load and unload time). The finite field multiplication is more 
costly. The number of clock cycles for its computation depends on size of the finite field. 
Compared to FF-addition and FF-squaring and FF-Multiplication, the FF inversion is a 
very expensive operation. It is performed by software using basic finite field operations 
(Sect. 5.3.2).
5.3 .1  F in ite  F ie ld  A r ith m e tic
Elliptic curve calculation over finite fields is based on finite field addition, subtraction, 
multiplication, squaring and division(Fig. 5.1). Here, we will focus on binary polynomial 
fields GF(2m). Using polynomial basis for finite field representation a field element a £ 
GF(2m) can be represented as a — am- i x m ~ 1 +  am- \ x m~l +  . . .  +  a ix 1 + aoxo where 
aj £ G F(2). Addition of two polynomials a and b is performed by adding coefficient a* 
and bi in modulo 2, which is a bitwise XOR operation of a and b. For example, adding 
two polynomials a = x 3 + x 2 + 1 and b = x 2 +  x 1 can be computed as ( 1 1 0 1  +  0 1 1 0 ) =  
(1101 X O R  0110) =  1011 or c = a + b = x 3 +  a: 1 +  1. In GF(2m) calculation addition 
and subtraction are the same, since 1 +  1 =  0 mod 2 , i.e. 1 is the inverse of 1. It is clear 
that representing elements of G F (2 m) in a digital computer is easy, since it contains only 
zeroes and ones(Fig. 5.2).
Multiplication of two elements a.b £ G F(2m) is carried out by multiplying two -poly-
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Figure 5.2: Representing an element in Galois field GF(2m)
a o a > a 2 a 3 a4 a 5 a6
A member of GF(2A7)
nomials using the distributive law and then reducing the resultant polynomial in modulo 
2 and then modulo f(x ) . f (x )  is of degree of m and defines GF{2m) for a chosen field 
of degree to. For example, given polynomials a = x 3 + x  + 1 and b = x 3 +  1 of G F(24), 
represented as a = 1 0 1 1  and b =  1 0 0 1 , co = a x b  = x 6 + x 4 + x + l  can be computed as:






Assuming f ( x )  = x 4 + x 3 + l , represented as f  — 11001, the reduction c =  co mod f  = 






An illustrative way to look at reduction is that f is aligned with the most significant 
bit of the operand and added until the degree of the result is smaller than to. A parallel
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architecture for finite field multiplication is depicted in figure 5.3. An AND gate matrix 
and an XOR tree performs the multiplication. Squaring can be performed easily using XOR 
gates, specially if the finite field is defined over a trinomial [58].
5 .3 .2  F in ite  F ie ld  Inverse
The multiplicative inverse of any element o E F 2 m is the element a - 1  E F2 m such that 
aa~ 1 — 1 mod /(x ) , where f (x )  is the irreducible polynomial of the finite field.
Inversion is the most costly operation in finite field arithmetic. Basically there are two 
methods for calculating inverse, using Fermat’s little theorem and using extended Euclidean 
algorithm [64].
The Itoh-Tsuji algorithm [59] is the most efficient technique to compute an inverse based
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Figure 5.4: Finite Field Squarer in G F(27) [58]
« 0  a -2 113 114 «« «<s
on Fermat’s little theorem. Fermat theorem in finite field states that,
a — 1 mod f (x )  , therefore - i  _  /,2 m —2  _  / 2 m_1 —1 ^ 2a = a = (a* - 1)".
Figure 5.5 depicts the basic idea in Itoh-Tsuji inverse algorithm, where a 2 * - 1  is calculated 
in 3 steps (log2  8  ). In step n one field multiplication and 2n _ 1  field squaring is needed.
Figure 5.5: Simplified Inverse Calculation
noo 11110000
11111111 2 -1  a -  a
In general a2" 1 can be calculated iteratively using equation 5.1. The complete algo­
rithm for inverse is shown in table 5.4.
a 2 " - 1 =
(a2 2 )2 "/2 (a2 2 n  even
(5.1)
a(a 2 § - 1 ) 2  n  odd
Calculating a~ 1 in GF(2m) needs M (m ) =  [log2(m — 1)J +  h(m  — 1 ) — 1 multiplication 
and m  — 1  squaring, where h(x) is hamming weight of x  (the number of non-zero bits in 
the binary representation o fx ).
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Table 5.4: Itoh-Tsuji Inverse Algorithm
Algorithm: Itoh-Tsuji Inverse Algorithm 
In p u t: a G GF(2n), m  =  m ,2 \ m, e  {0,1}
Output: b =  a - 1
b =  am n _ 1  
e =  1
For i  = n-2 to  0
b = b2e x b  
e — 2 e
if to* = =  1  then  
b = b2 x a 
e =  e +  1 
End If 
EndFor 
b = b2 
Return b
If the processor is meant to be used on a single finite field so the squaring can be 
efficiently optimized [58]. For irreducible polynomial / ( x) — x m + x l + I the maximum 
squarer complexity is (m +  f +  l) /2  and 4m gates for f ( x )  — x m +  x 11 +  x a  + x t3  + 1. For 
trinomial the critical path delay is at most two gate delays [58].
Since the Itoh-Tsuji inverse algorithm is based on squaring and multiplication, only a 
small hardware structure is needed for inverse. In fact, in the presented processor inverse 
is performed by software. In order to perform efficient squaring, REP SQR A instruction is 
defined, which performs squaring in one clock cycle. A data path from accumulator to the 
squarer makes this instruction possible (Fig. 5.6).
The simulation waveforms which shows the squaring is shown in figure 5.13. For scalable 
processors using Itoh-Tsuji algorithm is not efficient since squaring hardware cannot be
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optimized for a specific field and therefore cannot be done in a single cycle.
Effect of inverse calculation in performance
For GF(2m) where m  <  256 the inversion takes approximately 10M  + (m — 1)5. A scalar 
multiplication using Montgomery method takes 6 (m — 1 )M  +  5(m — 1)5 +  3(m — 1 )A. 
Implemented on an architecture similar to those in table 5.1 for G F(2167), inversion time 
will be about 5% of scalar multiplication time. It can be concluded that fine tuning on the 
inversion algorithm will not result in a high boost on the overall performance.
5 .3 .3  Scalar M u ltip lica tio n  A lg o r ith m
Scalar multiplication is the fundamental operation in any elliptic curve cryptosystem. Points
on an elliptic curve E  over finite field GF(2m) with a binary operation, called point addition,
form an finite additive Abelian group. If P  is a point on elliptic curve E  and A; is a
large scalar, computation of the form Q — kP  = P  +  P  +  P  H +  P  is defined as scalar
k times
multiplication. The result of scalar multiplication is another point Q on the elliptic curve. 
The main question in any elliptic curve cryptosystems is: How fast can this operation can be 
done? Table 5.5 categorizes commonly used methods for fast scalar multiplication [7] [10] [9]. 
Selecting a proper method for kP  depends on the cryptography protocol being used as well 
as the implementation platform.
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Table 5.5: Classification of scalar multiplication techniques
Name of Method Basic Idea
Comb [16] Precompute tables of 2m P
Addition chains [7] k =  ^Zr=o1 h
Windowing (Fix, Variable) to—ary [10] Precompute tables of fcjP ki € { 0 ,1 ,.. . ,  to — 1 }
Scalar recoding [7] Fewer zero in binary representation of k (NAF)
Point Halving [13] [13] All point doubling replaced with point halving operation
Montgomery kP  method [61] The x-coordinates of the sum of two points whose 
difference is known can be computed in terms of 
2 -coordinates of the involved points.
Koblitz curves [2] Using anomalous binary curves (or ABC’s)
In 1987 a new approach to scalar multiplication was proposed by Montgomery[17]. In 
[61] Montgomery method is converted to projective space and a very efficient scalar mul­
tiplication algorithm is derived. Table 5.6 compares the calculation cost of Montgomery 
method with IEEE standard method. As it is shown implementations based on the Mont­
gomery algorithm are faster. Most high speed ECC implementation in table 5.3, including 
the proposed processor, have used this algorithm for scalar multiplication[57][53][44][47][52]. 
The interesting fact about this algorithm is that it is inherently secure against side channel 
attack. In the proposed architecture, the algorithm is tuned for the pipeline multiplier 
and the processor’s parallel architecture. The complete explanation of Montgomery scalar 
multiplication is given in chapter 3.
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Table 5.6: Cost of scalar multiplication on GF(2m) for different algorithms
Scalar Multiplication Algorithm #  Operations
Montgomery, Projective version [61] (m-l)(6M+3A+5S) +  (10M+7A+4S+I)
IEEE 1362, NAF representation (Average) [21] (m-l)(8.7M+6.3A+6.3S) +(3M +S+I)
5.3.4 Performance Estimation for ECPs Based on BPW S M ultipliers 
Minimum number of clock cycle for kP  calculation
The lower and upper bound of performance for the architectures which use Bit Parallel 
Word Serial (BPWS) multipliers can be estimated as follows. The multiplication takes M  — 
fm/D~\ +  3 cycles, assuming 2 clock cycles for loading the input registers of the multiplier 
and one cycle for storing the result. Although addition and squaring axe performed in one 
cycle, extra cycles are needed to load and unload the registers, therefore A  =  3 cycles for 
addition and 5  =  2  cycle for squaring is assumed. Using Montgomery scalar multiplication 
[61], the upper bound (UB) is derived in table 5.6. At the best case, where all additions and 
squaring operations can be performed in parallel with multiplication (we assume M  > A  
, M  > 5) the lower bound (LB)can be calculated by omitting all additions and squaring 
operations. Therefore we will have,
UB = (m — 1 ) ( 6  M  +  3 A  + 55) +  (10 M  + 7A + 4S + I)
L B  = (m — 1)(6M) +  (10M 4-1) (5.2)
where M  — \m/D~\ +  3, A  — 3 ,5  =  2 ,1 «  10M  +  (m — 1)5
Experimenting with the processor architecture shows that the \m/D~\ =  4 ratio mini­
mizes the number of multiplication cycles but is long enough to let additions and/or squar­
ing to be done in parallel with multiplication. Therefore the lower bound for kP  can be 
approximated as
L B  «  43(m -  1). (5.3)
Unless a proper pipeline mechanism is used, faster operation cannot be achieved using this 
class of architecture.
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Critical Path length
If the finite field GF(2m) is generated by and irreducible polynomial f (x )  then the maximum 
critical path is equal to Ct  — Ta +  (R°g2 m l +  (r — 1 ))Tx  where r  is the number of terms 
in the irreducible polynomial f{x). In BPWS multipliers where,
TO-1 D - 1
A(x) = aix% i and B{x) =  ^ 2  biX1, , where cn, hi e  {0,1} 
i=0 i=0
the critical path will be
CT =  Ta  + ( riog2  D] +  (r -  1  ))TX (5.4)
, where Tx  and Ta  are the delays of AND gate and XOR gate. Using irreducible trinomial 
this can be further reduced to C t  =  Ta +  (riog2(m — 1 )] +  2 )Tx  [58]. C t  determines the 
upper bound for the clock frequency of the ECP.
5.4 D esign Flow
The presented crypto-processor requires components that operate on large bit vectors (167 
bits on GF{2167) ). This makes validation of synthesis results difficult and time consuming 
due to large amount of simulation elements. The complexity often can be reduced by scaling 
the signal vectors down. Adding such flexibility is excess work, but it pays off. The processor 
is designed to work with any finite field which is based on a trinomial or a pentanomial. 
Therefore most validations were performed on small fields like GF(215).
The design flow is depicted in Fig. 5.4. A bit-exact C program was developed, which 
allows us to check the HDL thoroughly. Test vectors for Galois field of different sizes were 
applied to both the HDL and the bit-exact program, and the results were checked against 
each other using another program to ensure the proper operation of the hardware. An 
assembler program for the crypto-processor is also developed which lets us to assemble 
programs written for the processor. The processor was synthesized and optimized using 
Synopsys Design Analyzer ® for CMOS 0.18 and Xilinx ISE® for FPGA.
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The architecture is highly optimized toward the execution of scalar multiplication algorithm. 
It supports finite field arithmetic, some 8  bits integer calculation and control transfer in­
structions. The finite field arithmetic unit utilizes parallelism in instruction level , which 
permits parallel execution of addition, squaring and multiplication. The finite field process­
ing unit consists of an ALU, a multiplier and a register file. These units are controlled by 
the main control unit. In addition, a very small 8 -bit processor is provided which performs 
integer calculations like counting and shifting. The communication with the host processor 
is implemented through utilization of a command register and a data register. Initially, 
the host processor uploads elliptic curve domain parameters and the code using these two 
registers (Fig. 5.8). FYom then on, communication is limited to the exchange of raw and 
processed data. Utilization of communication registers allows the two processors to operate 
independently, and have different clock signals. The processor is implemented in G F(2167) 
but neither the scalar multiplication code nor the architecture is hardwired to the size of 
the Galois Field.
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Figure 5.9: Architecture of the Finite Field Multiplier
RBUS
[m od
A x B mod f(x)
M ultiplier
The number of finite field multiplication in a scalar multiplication is approximately 6 (m —1) 
for G F(2 m)(Table 5.6). Therefore a high performance multiplier is very crucial. ALU uses a 
bit parallel word serial (BPWS) multiplier based on the algorithm in [60]. In order to achieve 
a performance better than L B  «  43(m — 1), the input registers A  and B, intermediate 
register Pi and output register P  are configured as a pipeline (Fig.5.9). This arrangement 
permits a finite field multiplication to be performed in M  =  [m/D] + 1  cycles, which would 
otherwise take M  = \m /D ] +  3 in similar designs [53] [57].
Squarer
The ALU employs a bit-parallel squarer [58]. Synthesized for a specific Galois field, this 
squarer leads to a very efficient hardware which performs the squaring in one clock cycle.
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Scalable 2  ECP implementations cannot use this architecture, since the size of finite field 
is not known at the time of hardware synthesis. Therefore they have relatively longer kP  
execution time [36] [38] [44] [47].
Instruction Set
The instruction set is sub divided into three categories: Finite field arithmetic, integer 
processing and control transfer (Fig. 5.10, table 5.7). Finite field arithmetic instructions 
are further split into three threads. The compiler analyzes the scalar multiplication program 
and detects finite field operations to be executed in parallel. Such operations are packed 
into one finite field arithmetic type instruction.






Type ALU Mult Reg. File
Type OP Code Src Dest
Type OP Code Fig Addr
5.6 Im plem entation
5.6 .1  H D L  S im u la tion
HDL simulation is carried out using Cadence NCVerilog®. Figure 5.11 and 5.12 shows the
waveforms at the beginning and end of the simulation on G F(2167). The hardware was
simulated and tested for G F(216), GF(2167) and G F(2233) using 1000, 100 and 10 random
test vectors respectively. The simulation takes 6660 clock cycles on G F(2167) which is
2 Being able to change both field size and the elliptic curve parameters without reprogramming the 
hardware ~
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O.lmSec at 6 6 M H z. In terms of execution speed, this result is faster than similar FPGA 
implementations [53] [46] [62] [57].
5 .6 .2  S y n th esis  R esu lt  
FPG A
The HDL is synthesized for Xilinx XC2V2000 FPGA using Xilinx tools. Table 5.10 sum­
marizes the hardware resource usage of the processor in terms of lookup tables (LUT) and 
flip-flops (FF) in FPGA implementation. The processor operates at 6 6 M H z  and performs 
the scalar multiplication in G F(2167) in 100fiSec . The synthesis result shows tha t the 
maximum operation frequency for the processor is 90M H z.
ASIC Sim ulation
The processor is synthesized and simulated for TSMC CMOS 0.18 technology using Synopsys® 
and Cadence NCVerilog®. Using synthesis information obtained from Synopsys®, the per­
formance and the hardware size of the processor on TSMC 0.18 \xm technology is obtained. 
The hardware size is about 36000 gates and the clock frequency can be as high as 300M H z. 
For the proposed architecture we have r  =  3, D — 42, Ta «  T x  »  0.3n5ec (from Synopsys 
report). Putting into equation 5.4 results to Ct  ~  9TX =  2.7nSec. Synopsys report shows 
that the critical path equals to 3.2nSec. This confirms that the proposed architecture sat­
isfies the critical path bound Implemented on ASIC. It takes 22fiSec to complete one scalar 
multiplication operation in G F(2 167), which is faster than reported ASIC implementations. 
Table 5.8 summarizes the synthesis results in CMOS 0.18.
ASIC Im plem entation
The ASIC design flow in fig. 5.4 is carried out to the very end. ie. The CMOS 0.18 layout 
is implemented using Cadence SoC Encounter. This layout is ready for fabrication. Refer 
to appendix for a snap shop of the layout.
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5.6 .3  P erform an ce a n d  com p arison
Table 5.9 shows the number of clock cycle needed to execute k P , for several processors. 
These processors have the following specifications in common:
• They are among the fastest implementations of ECP (see Table 5.3).
• They are implemented on an advanced FPGA architecture.
• All use parallel polynomial based finite field multipliers.
• Number of clock cycles needed to perform kP  is linearly dependent on field size m  
(If we keep the size of m /D  in finite field multiplier constant, where D  is the sized of 
digit or word in the bit-parallel word- serial multiplier).
• They Perform inverse using Itoh-Tsuji algorithm (except [53]).
• All Use Projective coordinates for kP  calculation (most use BPWS).
It can be concluded that, for non scalable ECP processors, these specifications lead to an 
efficient design. Among them, the proposed architecture needs less clock cycles to perform 
scalar multiplication. Another important factor in the architecture is the maximum critical 
path in the processor. However it is not easy to estimate what the maximum clock rate 
for [57] [46] would be if they would have been implemented on the a platform like ours. 
Simulation shows that the proposed processor can run at 300M H z  when implemented 
on CMOS 0.18 technology, which is the minimum possible critical path for this type of 
architecture. This is also a good number compared to the designs in tables 5.3 and 5.2.
5.7 Conclusion
An architecture for an Elliptic curve processor is proposed. The processor can perform 
10,000 scalar multiplications per second on G F(2167) , which is considerably faster that 
the recent FPGA implementations. The processor has a very short critical path which is 
on the parallel multiplier. Synthesis results in CMOS 0.18 micron show that the proeessor
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can run at 300M H z  clock frequency which results in 22fj,Sec for a scalar multiplication on 
G F (2 167). The synthesis result confirms that the design satisfies the critical bound.
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Table 5.7: Elliptic Curve Processor Instruction Set
8-bit processor
MOV rx , d8 move immediate data to rx register
DJNZ r x , addr decrement rx jump to addr if not zero
DEC rx decrement rx
INC rx increment rx
SHL {c,rx} shift left Carry and rx
SHL {rx ,c} shift left rx and Carry









MOV Rx, P move product to Rx
MOV Rx, A
MOV A, Rx
MOV S, Rx load multiplier register with Rx
Control Transfer
JMP f i g , s e t ,  addr fig is Z (Zero flag), C (Carry flag), M (User flag)
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Total «  1555271
Table 5.9: Number of clock cycles for kP
Design Number of Clk for kP Point Representation
Presented 39 (to — l)+inv. Montgomery Projective
[46] 44(m — l)+inv. (est.) Projective with NAF 0
[57] 47(m — l)+inv. (est.) Montgomery Projective, D=42 b
[53] 57(m — 1) (est.) Montgomery Projective
[62] 93(m -  l)+inv. (est.) Projective with NAF
inv. =  (m — 1 ) +  M ( [log2(m — 1)J +  h(m  — 1) — 1 ), M  «  7 
“In [46] authors didn’t  assume NAF representation for scalar k.
6In [57], maximum D is 16. Probably they were not able to  use D=42 due to limited resource in their 
FPGA. We assume D=42 here.
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Proposed 0 . 1 0 0 285 167 7562, 2378 6 6 XCV2000 2004
[57] 0 . 2 1 0 167 3000, 1769 76.6 XCV400E 2 0 0 0
[53] 0.143 326= 2m 163 20068, 6321 66.4 XCV2000 2 0 0 2
[62] 0.233 250 163 10017, 1930 6 6 XCV2000 2003
Proposed 0.140 451 233 13900, 3200 6 6 XCV2000 2004
[46] 0.123 est. - 233 19440, 16970 1 0 0 XCV6000 2003
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Figure 5.13: Simulation Waveforms while calculating Inverse
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Chapter 6
Discussions
6.1 Summary o f Contribution
This work proposes efficient methods for ECC both in algorithm level and in arithmetic 
level. In algorithm level a parallel method for scalar multiplication is introduced which uses 
two processors to perform the kP  operation. Using proper implementation this method is 
200% faster than conventional single processor methods. The method can be implemented 
both in hardware and software.
At the arithmetic level, a high performance elliptic curve processor architecture on 
GF{2m) is proposed. The architecture employs parallel execution of finite field arithmetic, 
to achieve high execution speed. Implemented on Xilinx Virtex 2000 FPGA, the processor 
can perform 10,000 scalar multiplications per second on G F (2167) , which is considerably 
faster that the recent FPGA implementations. The processor has a very short critical 
path which is on the parallel multiplier. Synthesis results on CMOS 0.18 micron show 
that the processor can run at 300M H z  clock frequency which results in 22fiSec for a 
scalar multiplication on G F(2 167). The processor is compared to various ECC hardware 
implementations. The comparison is limited to the processors on GF(2m). The processor 
speed presented is higher than any other reported ECC hardware implementation.
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6.2 Future Work
FPGAs are a suitable platform for the hardware implementation of the proposed parallel 
algorithm. The information in chapter 3 can be used for the selection of proper point 
representation system. For the proposed processor ASIC implementation is very desirable 
since the simulation results shows the it will be the fastest kP  calculation ever reported.
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Test Code
1  # i n c l u d e  < s t d l i b . h >
2 # i n c l u d e  <stdio.h>
3 # i n c l u d e  "gmp.h"
4  # i n c l u d e  < t i m e . h >
5 # i n c l u d e  <math.h>
6
7 //typedef unsigned long long scalar_t;
8  # d e f i n e  s c a l a r _ t  m p z . t
9
10 i n t get.bit (scalar_t k, i n t  i);
11 v o i d set_bit (scalar_t k, i n t  i);
12 v o i d clr_bit (scalar.t k, i n t  i);
13 i n t kP-time_s ( c h a r  * ks, i n t  t_add, i n t  *na, i n t  *nd);
14 i n t kP_time_s2 ( c h a r  * ks, i n t  ADD_DBLjratio);
15 c h a r *str_reverse ( c h a r  *d, c h a r  *s);
16 v o i d to_NAF (scalar.t k);
17 v o i d to_NAF2 (scalar.t k);
18 c h a r *itos (scalar.t k);
19 v o i d test_recording(void);
20 i n t kP-time (scalar.t k, i n t  n.bits, i n t  t_add, i n t  *na, i n t  *nd,
21 I n t  *cnt_in_add_ave, i n t  *cnt_in_addjnax, i n t  buf_len
22 );
23 i  n t ave_kP_time ( i n t  n_samples, i n t  n.bits, i n t  ADD_DBL_ratio, i n t
24 buf _len) ;
25 //#def ine ADD_DBLJlATI0 3 —
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29 //perf ormance_table() ;





37 int n.bits, t;
38 c h a r  *s, d[50];
39 time_t rawtime;
40
41 //- algorithm parameters
42 int ADD_overJDBL_ratio = 3;
43 int buf_len = 4;
44 i n t  nsamples = 10000;
45
46 time ( fcrawtime ); printf ("\n*/,s\n\n" , ctime(&rawtime));
47 printf ("#Samples = 7»i", nsamples) ;
48 printf("\n\\#bits & ADD/DBL & \\#ECADD & \\#ECDBL & \\#0p & \\#0p Std
49 DBL-ADD Method & Ave \\#Data in buf & Max \\#Data in buf & Speed
50 up \\hline\\hline");
51 printf("\ n = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = " )  ;
52







66 s = "10101010000001111111111000001100000001";








//nsamples = 0x7FFFFFFF; //result of the scount takes 2 days and is 
wrong!
for (n_bits=150; n_bits<=300; n_bits+=50)
ave_kP_time(nsamples, n.bits, ADD_over_DBL_ratio,buf_len );
61 }
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70 t = kP.time_s2(d, ADD.over_DBL_ratio);
71 * /





77 int performance.vs.buf len_graph(void)
78 {
79
80 int ADD.over_DBL_ratio = 3;
81 int buf_len = 4;
82 int nsamples = 100;
83 int n.bits;
84
85 printf("#Samples = %i\n\n", nsamples);
86
87 //for(n_bits=150; n_bits<=300; n_bits+=50)
88 n.bits = 160;
89
90
91 f or (buf _len=l; buf_len<=10; buf_len++)
92
93 {
94 printf ("\n ’/.i ", buf JLen);
95 for (ADD .over _DBL_ratio=l; ADD.over _DBL_ratio<6;
96 ADD_over_DBL_ratio++)
97 {
98 ave_kP.time(nsamples, n.bits, ADD.over_DBL_ratio, buf_len );
99 }




104 for (ADD.over _DBL_ratio=l; ADD.over -DBL_xatio<6; ADD .over JDBL_ratio++)
105 {
106 printf ("\n\n #ADD/DBL = %i ", ADD.overJDBLjratio) ;
107 for(buf_len=l; buf_len<=10; bufj.en++)
108 {
109 printf ("\n ’/»i ", buf_len) ;
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114 r e t u r n  0 ;
115 }
116
117 # d e f i n e  M A X .I N T  ~ ( ( u n s i g n e d  l o n g  i n t )  1 )
118 # d e f i n e  a v e ( i )  ( ( i n t ) ( ( d o u b l e ) ( i ) / ( n _ s a m p l e s ) + 0 . 5 )  )




123 int na, nd, cnt.in.add.ave, cnt.in_add.max, t;
124 u n s i g n e d  long i n t  i;
125 int t_sum, na_sum, nd_sum;






132 cnt.in.add-jnax.ave =  cnt_in_add_ave_ave = t_sum = na_sum = nd_sum = 0;
133 for(i=0; i<n_samples; i++)
134 {
135 //mpz_rrandomb generates long strings of zeros or ones, might be
136 better f o r  testing
137 mpz.urandomb (k, r_state, n.bits); //200 bits random number
138 to_NAF2(k);
139 t = kP.time(k, n_bits, ADD_DBL_ratio, &na, fend, &cnt_in.add_ave,
140 &cnt.in_add_max, buf.len );
141 t.sum += t;
142 na_sum += na;
143 nd_sum += nd;
144 cnt_in_add_ave_ave += cnt_in_add_ave;
145 cnt.in.addjtax.ave + =  cnt_in_add_max;
146 //printf ("Xi-", cnt_in_add_max_ave);
147 / /  if((i& OxOOOOFFFF) == 0) printf( "  %lu", i);
148 //printf ("\n—  k='/.s nADD =%d nDBL =’/,d T =°/,d", itos(k), na, nd
149 t);




154 printf ( " \ n n _ b i t s = ° / 0i , n _ s a m p l e s = % l u  A D D / D B L = ' / , i  t _ a v e = ' / . i  n  A d d _ a v e = % i ,  n
155 D B L _ a v e = 7 ( i " , n.bits, nsamples, ADD_DBL_ratio, tjsum/nseimples,
156 na_sum/nsamples, nd.sum/nsamples);
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158 //- printf for performance.table
159 printf( "\n7.i & Zi & Zi & Zi & Zi & Zi & Z3.1f & Zi &
160 Zi \\hline", n.bits, ADD_DBL_ratio, ave(na_sum), ave(nd_sum) ,





166 //- printf for performance_vs_buflen_graph




1 7 1  r e t u r n  1 ;
172 }
173
174 i n t  kP.time(scalar.t k, i n t  n.bits, i n t  t_add, i n t  *na, i n t  *nd, i n t
175 *cnt_in_add_ave, i n t  *cnt.in.add.max, i n t  bufJLen)
176 {
177 i n t  i, b, in.add, n_add, n_dbl, cnt.in.add, dbl.wait;
178 l o n g  l o n g  i n t  ciaa; //count in add average!
179 i n t  max.cnt.in.add = buf_len*t_add;
180
181 dbl.wait = n_add = n.dbl =0;
182 in_add = get_bit(k, 0)==1; //put initial conditions
183 cnt.in.add = in.add ? t_add : 0;
184
185 //cannot find n.bit by mpz functions because it omits leading zeros
186 //and so decreases n.dbl!
187 //n.bits = mpz_sizeinbase(k, 2);
188
189
190 *cnt_in_add_ave = *cnt_in_add_max = ciaa =0;
191 for(i=0; iCn.bits; i++)
192 {
193
194 while (cnt.in.add > max.cnt .in .add)
195 {




200 if (cnt_in_add > *cnt_in_add_max) //this gives the maximum buffer size
201 *cnt_in_add_max = cnt_in_add;
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202
203 ciaa += cnt.in.add; //average of cnt_in_add essentially it is
204 proportional to the number of data in the circular buffer
205 b = get_bit(k, i);
206







214 cnt_in_add += t.add; //accumulate the time that you need to stay
215 in add mode
216 }
217 e l s e  //b is 0
218 {
219 if (cnt.in.add ==0 ) //if u have been enuf in add state and there
220 is no more one
221 {









231 e l s e  //b is 1
232 {
233 in.add = 1; //change state
234 n.add ++;





240 //should it be added to n.add? I think it should but the result is wrond
241 FATAL chk bjn
242 // n.add += (cnt.in.add/t.add) +((cnt_in_add70t_add) !=0 ? 1 :0) ; //ceil(
243 cnt.in.add/t.add)
244 *na = n.add;
245 *nd = n_dbl + dbl.wait;
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nt get.bit(scalar.t k, int i) 
r e t u r n  mpz.tstbit (k, i);
oid set_bit(scalar.t k, int i) 
mpz-setbit (k, i);
o i d  clr.bit(scalar.t k, i n t  i) 
mpz.clrbit (k, i);
246 *cnt_in_add.ave = ciaa / n.bits;
247


















266 i n t  kP_time_s(char * ks, i n t  t.add, i n t  *na, i n t  *nd)
267
268 mpz.t k;
2 6 9  i n t  rc;
270
271 mpz.init(k);
272 mpz_set_str(k, ks, 2);
273 //rc = kP_time(k, strlen(ks), t.add, na, nd);
274 mpz.clear (k);
275




280 i n t  kP_time_s2(char * ks, i n t  ADD_DBL_ratio)
281 {
2 8 2  m t  na, nd, t;
283
284
285 t = kP_time_s(ks, ADD_DBL_ratio, &na, &nd) ;
286 printf ("\ns=’/,s, n_bits='/,i, t=7,i na=%i, nd=“/„i", ks, strlen(ks), t, na,
287 nd);
2 8 8
2 8 9  r e t u r n  0 ;
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290 }
291
292 char *str_reverse(char *d, char *s)
293 {
294 int len, i;
295
296 len = strlen(s);
297 d[len] = 0;
298 for(i=0; i<len; i++)
299 d[len-i-l] = s[i];
300
301 r e t u r n  d;
302 }
303
304 /*this pice of software is from
305 ~/ansari4/Tutorials/Cryptography/C_Libraries/ECC/elliptic/ec_curve. c
306 an elliptic curve library writen by Paulo S.L.M. Barreto <pbarreto@uninet.
307 com.b r> http://pleuieta.terra.com.br/infonnatica/paulobarreto/
308 it shows a parrallel way of converting and integer to NAF
309 */
310 v o i d  to_NAF2(scalar.t k)
311 {
312 mpz.t h;
313 i n t  nb;
314
315 mpz_init(h);
316 mpz_mul_ui (h, k, 3);
317 mpz_xor(k, h, k); //we treat -1 and 1 the same! because we only want to
318 count
319 mpz_div_2exp (k, k, 1);
320 nb = mpz_sizeinbase(k, 2);
321 // if C nb > *n_bits)







329 o i d  tO-NAF(scalar.t x)
330 {
331 i n t  s, i, n.bits;
332 mpz.t y;
333 int xi, xi.l, ci;
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334
335 //See Coren, Computer Arithmetic book, Page 146, Table 6.4 for the
336 Algorithm
337 i n t  state.table [] = { 0, 2, 2, 1, 0, 3, 3, l};
338
339 mpz_init (y) ;
340 n.bits = mpz_sizeinbase(x, 2);
341 ci = 0;
342 //- it checks one extra bit, but that extra bit is zero and I need it
343 to make NAF
344 for(i=0; i<=n_bits; i++)
345 {
346 xi = get_bit(x, i );
347 xi.l = get_bit(x, i+1);
348 s = state.table[(xi_l<<2) | (xi < <  1) | ci] ;









3 5 8  }
3 5 9
3 6 0  void testjrecording(void)
3 6 1  {
3 6 2  mpz.t k;
3 6 3  c h a r  *s;
3 6 4
3 6 5  s =  " 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 " ;
3 6 6  //s =  " 1 1 1 1 0 1 " ;
3 6 7  mpz.init(k);
3 6 8
3 6 9  mpz_set_str(k, s, 2 ) ;
3 7 0  to_NAF (k);
3 7 1  printf (" \ns=°/.s \nk=°/0s " , s, itos(k));
3 7 2
3 7 3  mpz_set_str(k, s, 2 ) ;
3 7 4  to_NAF2(k);
3 7 5  printf (" \ns='/,s \nk=“/,s", s, itos(k));
3 7 6  printf(" \ n " ) ;
3 7 7  mpz.clear(k);
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378 }
379
380 # d e f i n e  M A X J J _ B I T S  1 0 2 4
381 char *itos( scalar.t k)
3 8 2  {
383 i n t  i, nb;
384 s t a t i c  char buf [ MAXJLBITS+1] ;
385 c h a r  *s = buf;
386
387 nb = mpz_sizeinbase(k, 2)—1;
388 i f  (nb> MAX_N_BITS) nb = MAXJLBITS;
389 for(i=nb; i>=0; i— )
390 *s++ = get.bit(k, i)? ’1’ : ’O’;
391 *s = 0;
392




1 # i n c l u d e  < b o r z o i . h >
2  # i n c l u d e  < f s t r e a m >
3 # i n c l u d e  < u n i s t d . h >
4  # i n c l u d e  " n i s t . c u r v e s . h "
5
6 / *
7 (c) Bijan Ansari Tue Dec 16 14:59:49 EST 2003
8 all parts of Monti algorithm works Mon Dec 29 21:28:08 EST 2003
9
10 This program uses borZoi Elliptic Curve library to Implement Projective
11 coordinate version of Montgomery scalar multiplication.
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25 F2M y;
26
27 F2M *R = &X1;
28
29 Biglnt k; //the scalar
30 EC_Domain_Parameters dp = NIST_B_233;
31 //int m, kl, k2; //f(x) = x~m + x~kl + x~k2 + 1
32 //const int m = 1 5 ,  kl = 4;
33 //const int m = 1 6 7 ,  kl = 6;
34 //const int m = 233, kl = 74;
35 //longinteger k //the scalar
36





42 void aff ine_to_projective(void);
43 void Montgomery_P_plus_Q P_plus_Pl(void) ;
44 void Montgomery.? _plus_Q P_plus_P2(void) ;
45 void Itoh_Tsuji_inverse(int m, int in, int out);
46 void calc_xyl(void);
47 void calc_xy2(void);
48 void Mdouble(int src);
49 void Madd(int dest);
50 int scalar_mult(void);
51 void swap (void);
52 void print(char *s, F2M x, F2M y);
53 void init_regfile(void);
54 void dump_regfile(int n);
55 #define dump(A){ std::cout < <  "\n" < <  #A < <  "= " < <  A; }
56 //void dump(F2M A);
57 void use_Trionomial(int m, int kl);




62 / * -
63 scalarunult () tested at Tue Feb 17 19:58:53 EST 2004 again
64 it produces correct result using all 4 scalar multiplication
65 functions
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73 //scalar .mult() ;
74
75 init_regfile();
76 //WARNING msb of k MUST be one, otherwise the result is not the same
77 as the
78 //asm program in the ECP. because ECP assumes MSB of k is one.
79
80 //for GF(2~233)
81 k = 1;
82 k « =  232;
83
84 //for GF(2~15)
85 k = l;//in the asm program R4 is k!




90 k = 1;
91 k <<= 166;
92
93




98 std::cout < <  "\n— " ;
99 }
100













std::cout < <  "\n— " < <  s ;
std::cout <<"\nx=" < <  x < <  "\ny=" < <  y;
scalar .mult( v o i d )
/♦♦Warning**
original_montgomery_scalar_multiplication() , curve.mul(k, dp.G) use
the
global "dp" variable and the finite field which is defined there"while
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113 projective_montgomery_scalar.multiplicationl() and
114 projective_montgomery_scalar_multiplication2() use the finite filed
115 which is defined at the start of the mainO program ie use_Trionomial(
116 233, 74)
117 */
118 //k = hexto_BigInt("A9993E364706816ABA3E25717850C26C9CD0D89D");
119 k = hexto_BigInt("D7"); //in the asm program R4 is k!
120
121 use_Trionomial(15, 4);
122 b = dp.b;
123 x = dp.G.x;
124 y = dp.G.y;
125 R[3] = 1; //R[3] must be zero otherwise affine_to_projective()
126 doesn’t work fine
127
128 //in the hardware R4 is k, but here k is in another variable
129 initjregfile();
130 print("original points", x, y );
131
132 projective_montgomery_scalar_multiplication2() ;
133 print("projective_montgomery_scalar_multiplication2()" , X2, Z2);
134
135 proj ectivejnontgomery.scalarjnultiplicationl ();
136 print ("projective-montgomery_scalar_multiplicationl()", X2, Z2);
137
138
139 original_montgomery.scalar.multiplication0  ;
140 print("original-Scalar_multiplication()", X2, Z2) ;
141
142 Curve curve (dp.a, dp.b);
143 Point P = curve.mul(k, dp.G);
144 print("Borzoi library", P.x, P.y);
145





151 //values are interpreted as hex
152
153 str_to_F2M("39" ,R[0] ) ;
154 str_to_F2M("24" ,R[1]) ;
155 str_to_F2M("55" ,R[2] ) ;
156 str_to_F2M("76" ,R[3] ) ;
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157 str_to_F2M("D7",R[4]); //MSB of k MUST be one, ECP asm programs
158 assumes so!
159 str_to_F2M("86" ,R[5] ) ; //R[4] is k and MSB of k must be one, that's
160 why it is 16 bits and the others are 8 bits just to make
161 things simple
162 str_to_F2M("64" ,R [6] ) ;




167 str_to_F2M("2" ,R [1] ) ;
168 str_to_F2M("3" ,R[2]);
169 str_to_F2M("4" ,R[3] );
170 str_to_F2M("5" ,R[4] );
171 str_to_F2M (" 6", R [5]);
172 str_to_F2M("7" ,R[6] );






179 v o i d  affine_to_projective( v o i d )
180 {
181 XI = x;
182 ZI = R [3]; //R[3]; in the ECP assembly file here we have R[3]
183
184 Z2 = x~2;
185 X2 = (Z2~2) + b;
186
187 }
188 o i d  projective_montgomery_scalar_multiplicationl()
189 {
190 m t  1;
191 int i;
192
193 1 = k.numBits ();
194 aff ine_to_projective();
195
196 for(i=l-2; i>=0; i— )
197 {
198 std::cout < <  "\n==l==\nbit " < <  i < <  "= "<< k.getBit(i) ;
199 if(k.getBit(i) == 1)
200 {
103
R ep ro d u ced  with p erm issio n  o f  th e  copyrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction  prohibited w ithout p erm ission .








208 std::cout < <  "\n==l==";
209 }
210 //calc_xyl(); //answer is in X2, Z2
211 }
212











224 std::cout < <  "\nnum bits= " < <  1 ;
225 std::cout < <  "\nk= " < <  k ;
226 for(i=l-2; i>=0; i--)
227 {
228 std::cout < <  "\n==2==\nbit " < <  i < <  "= "<< k.getBit(i) ;





234 if(k.getBit(i) == 1)
235 swapO;
236 dump_regfile(i); :
237 std:: cout < <  "\n==2==M;
238 }
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245 Curve curve (dp.a, dp.b);
246 Point PI, P2;
247 int i, 1;
248 Point P(x, y);
249
250 1 = k.numBits ();
251 PI = P;
252 P2 = curve.dbl(P);




257 PI = curve.add(PI, P2);




262 P2 = curve.add(PI, P2);




267 X2 = Pl.x;
268 Z2 = Pl.y;
269 }
270
271 void Mdouble(int src)
272 {




277 X = XI;




282 X = X2;
283 Z = Z2;
284 }
285
286 F2M x3 = (X~4) + b * (Z~4);
287 F2M z3 = (Z*2) * (X~2);
288
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302 void Madd(int d est)
303 {
304 F2M z3 = (XI * Z2 + X2* Z l) “2;
305 F2M x3 = (x * z3) + (XI * Z2) * (X2 * Z I ) ;
306
307 if(d e s t= = l)
308 {
309 XI = x3;








323 T = XI; XI = X2; X2 = T;
324 T = ZI; ZI = Z2; Z2 = T;
325 }\
326 void Montgomery _P_plus_Q P_plus_Pl (void)
327 {
328 /* equivalent to
329 (XI, ZI) = Mdouble(Xl, ZI)
330 (X2, Z2) = Madd(Xl, ZI, X2, Z2)
331 */




314 X2 = x3;
315 Z2 = z3;
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333 X2 = ZI * X2; / / I
334 ZI = ZI "  2;
335
336 Z2 = XI * Z2; //2
337 XI = XI ~ 2;
338
339 R4 = ZI ~ 2;
340
341 ZI = XI * ZI; / /3
342
343
344 XI = XI “  2;
345
346 F2M t X2 + Z2;
347 X2 = X2 * Z2; / / 4
348 Z2 = t ’ 2;
349
350
351 R4 = R4 * b; / / 5
352 XI = XI + R4;
353
354
355 R4 = x *■ Z2; / / 6




360 --oid Montgomery_P_plus_Q P_plus_P2(void)
361 {
362 //this is implemented in monti4.s
363 R[l] = R[2] * R [1] ; dump(R[l] ) ; //I
364 R[2] = R[2] “ 2;
365
366 R[3] = R[0] * R[3] ; dump(R[3]) ;//2
367 R[0] = R[0] " 2;
368
369 R[4] = R[2] * 2;
370
371 R[2] = R[0] * R[2] ; dump (R [2] ) ;//3
372
373 R[0] = R[0] ~ 2;
374
375 F2M t = R [1] + R[3];
376 R[l] = R[l] * R[3] ; dump(R[l] ) ;//4
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377 R[3] = t " 2;
378
379
380 R[4] = R[4] * R[5] ; dump (R [4] ) ;//5 R5 = b
381 R[0] = R[0] + R[4] ;
382
383
384 R[4] = R[6] * R [3]; dump(R[4]);//6 R6 = x









394 //this routine is written in a way to be the same as the
395 //hardware implementation, and it doesn’t mean it is a good
396 //software implementation
397 void Itoh_Tsuji_inverse(int m, int in, int out)
398 {
399 //A is the accumulator, S is the input register of the multiplier
400 //this is implemented in inv.rom
401 F2M A, S;
402 byte mO, e, sq_cnt, i, c;
403
404 A = R[in];
405 e = 1;
406 //m0 = dp.m & (~1);
407 mO = m & (!1);
408 i = 8;
409
410 while( (i!=0) && ((mO & 0x80) == 0))
411 {
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421 }
422
423 w h i le ( i !=0)
424 {



















c = (mO & 0x80) != 0; 
mO <<= 1; 
e = (e<<l) | c;
l'
A = S * A;
}
sq_cnt = e; 
while(sq_cnt— ) 
A = A~ 2;
if (c) 
{
S = R[in] ; 
A = A“2;
A = S * A;
444 }
445
446 A = A~2;
447 R[out] = A;
448
449







457 // find this from Lopez paper and orlando paper (all are in the white
458 folder)
459 F2M xk, yk;
460
461 //F2M F2M::inverse ()
462 //F2M F2M::sqr ()
463
464 R4 = x*Zl*Z2; ^
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465
466
467 R4 = R4.inverse();
468 /*
4 6 9  R 4  =  T 3  j
470 Itoh_Tsuji_inverse(dp.m, 4, 4); use this one becaue dp is not always
471 correctly set!
472 T3 = R4;
473 */
474
475 F2M T = x * Z2 * XI;
476 dump(T);
477
478 xk = x * Z2 * XI * R4;




482 X2 = xk;





488 I I ---------------------------------------------------------------------
489 —
490 void dump_regfile(int n)
491 {
492 std::cout < <  "\n-"<<n<<" Reg file
493 for (int i=7; i>=0; i— )
494 std: :cout «  "\nR" < <  i «  "= " «  R[i] ;
495 }
496
497 void use_Trionomial(int m, int k)
498 {








507 while(— n>0) //>0 for n equal 0 ~~4
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508 c*=a;
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Chip Layout
Chip layout: program memory, power rings, power strips, clock tree
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Chip layout: The whole chip in SoCE
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